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ABSTRACT
The high technology industry suffers from a phenomenon that is common to many
businesses and industries throughout the world - a "hockey-stick" demand skew. Such a
skew derives its name from the shape of the quarterly demand curve as it is viewed across
time. The demand curve is characterized by sales rates that are sluggish at the start of a
quarter, before increasing dramatically by quarter-end, and then dropping off again after the
close of the quarter.
Despite its lauded Direct Model, Dell Computer Corporation is not exempt from issues
concerning the hockey stick demand skew. A very definite quarterly skew exists for most of
Dell's customer segments, particularly those in which a direct sales team is active. The
author had the opportunity to spend seven months at Dell's facilities investigating this
demand phenomenon.
As an industry leader with their Direct Model, Dell's build-to-order strategy necessitates that
systems are produced and shipped at a rate that closely mirrors the sales rate. The variability
of a hockey-stick demand skew requires that the entire organization have the flexibility to
adapt quickly to changes throughout the quarter. However, such flexibility does not come
without a price. The end of quarter rush requires that manufacturing plan for excess
capacity and work overtime to meet peak demand periods. Logistical costs rise due to the
various expediting activities that must be undertaken. Accompanying these cost increases is
a drop in gross margin at the end of the quarter as a result of changes and variability in
procurement costs over the quarter. These factors effectively raise the marginal cost of
systems built at the end of the quarter as compared to the beginning.
In addition, an end-loaded sales demand places a large operational burden upon several
pieces of the Dell organization. Manufacturing must not only be prepared with excess
physical capacity at the end of a quarter, but must also have the necessary human resource
capacity to accommodate these large swings in demand. These operational constraints
provide a second impetus for a close examination of this issue at Dell.
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Finally, the greater the demand skew at Dell, the greater the financial risk for the company.
The late demand swing is, in effect, a double-edged sword of risk for the organization. Not
only does a large percentage of their demand for the quarter hit at once, but it hits at a time
late in the quarter when there is little or no time to make up the difference if something were
to happen. Any major disturbance within Dell's manufacturing structure, or that of their
supply base, within the last two weeks of the quarter could have a unconstructive impact on
unit volumes and total revenue for the quarter. For a company that is so intensely market
driven, this is quite an unfavorable scenario.
This triple nemesis of sub-optimal profitability, operational difficulties, and financial risk
provided the impetus for this thesis work and project. Within Dell, the first order of
business was to determine whether the hockey stick was internally or externally driven.
After that determination was made, the author utilized non-linear programming tools to
determine the optimal quarterly sales skew, based upon profitability measures. The final step
was then to identify the drivers of the demand skew and to determine how they could best
be manipulated to achieve the optimal skew. In this regard, Dell's Direct Model is notably
well suited to the task. Without an intricate, multi-layered sales channel, alterations can easily
be made within the sales and marketing arena that can immediately and dramatically change
the visage of the quarterly sales skew.
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Name: Donald Rosenfield
Title: Senior Lecturer
Name: Stanley Gershwin
Title: Senior Research Scientist
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The high technology industry suffers from a phenomenon that is common to many
businesses and industries throughout the world - a "hockey-stick" demand skew. Such a
skew derives its name from the shape of the quarterly demand curve as it is viewed across
time. The demand curve is characterized by sales rates that are sluggish at the start of a
quarter, before increasing dramatically by quarter-end, and then dropping off again after the
close of the quarter.
The cause of such a hockey-stick demand skew is a topic that is often widely debated within
companies. In most situations, the root cause is an accumulation of many practices within
the company and its surrounding industry and may include the sales practices, scheduling
procedures, and manufacturing logistics that are utilized throughout the entire supply chain.
Such practices are cumulative in nature across the supply base and are driven by quotas and
various incentives within organizations. These incentives may be either direct in nature, or
simply inherent to a given process, and are established around a time-based reporting
structure, such as weekly, monthly, or quarterly targets and metrics.
Historically, the primary response to this issue within organizations has been to build
finished goods inventory early in the quarter and then to drain this inventory as sales
volumes increase. In some situations, a tradeoff strategy has been developed between
finished goods inventory and excess production capacity, utilizing various inventory
modeling techniques to determine the optimum balance between the two. However, as
more firms strive toward build-to-order fulfillment strategies, this traditional response is no
longer adequate. In an era of lean manufacturers where the detrimental impact of inventory
has been much touted, an alternate approach must be formulated that not only treats the
problem, but also solves it.
The objective of this thesis is to examine the root causes of such hockey-stick demand skews
and to determine how to attack and eliminate these issues in an industrial environment. This
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thesis specifically examines the sales and manufacturing processes at Dell Computer
Corporation in Austin, Texas and their relation to the drivers and consequences of the
hockey stick phenomenon. Also explored within this thesis is the unique environment at
Dell and its Direct Model approach to customer order fulfillment, which serves to place the
company in a unique position to combat this troublesome issue.
1.2 THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis will begin with a brief overview of Dell Computer Corporation, its Direct Model,
and the high technology environment in which it operates. A discussion of the causes and
consequences of the hockey stick demand skew will follow in Section 3, along with a
summary of the traditional "solutions" that have been utilized to combat the problem in the
past. In Section 4, this author will discuss the impact of the hockey stick at Dell; focusing
particularly upon the reduced profitability, the operational burdens, and the increased
financial risk associated with the end of quarter demand spike. Section 5 reviews the non-
linear programming model, which was constructed to determine the optimal sales skew
according to profitability measures. In Section 6, a synopsis is given of the drivers of the
hockey stick demand skew, followed by the author's recommended solutions to the issue in
Section 7. Section 8 concludes with the key research findings and some suggested areas for
further study.
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2 DIRECT VS. INDIRECT
2.1 PRODUCT AND MARKET OVERVIEW
More than 50 years ago, the first general-purpose, electronic digital computer - the ENIAC
(Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) - cost over $500,000, weighted 30 tons,
and contained 18,000 vacuum tubes, 70,000 resistors, and 6,000 manual switches. Then in
1969, Robert Noyce, Gordon Moore, and Andy Grove became the pioneers of a new
technology called the silicon chip. Intel was born. By 1998, sales of personal computers
(PCs) had grown to $170 billion. Today the top four PC manufacturers - Compaq, Dell,
IBM, and HP - hold more than a third of the worldwide market.
Dell Computer Corporation, along with Gateway, has made its name in the industry as a
direct seller of computers. The company's build-to-order systems have created lower
inventories and costs due to the lack of a need to add reseller operations and incentives to
the mix. The success of Dell's Direct Model is obvious when one considers that it is the
only FORTUNE 500 company with annual sales and earnings increases of more than 40%
since 1995. It has made Dell the best-performing stock in the past decade measured against
other companies in the S&P 500 Index. (1)
That success has left every other major PC manufacturer scrambling to replicate Dell's
successes. What is it about Dell's Direct Model that has garnered so much interest within
the industry? The swiftness of technological change is at the heart of that question. To be
competitive, companies must be quick to respond to the constant influx of technologies
within the computer industry and must continually be listening to the wants and needs of
their customers. They must also be able to respond in a quick fashion to fulfill these
customer needs as they occur or else bear the risk of being left behind.
One of the many penalties of not being quick and responsive is the liability of excess
inventory. If a company has a supply chain packed with yesterday's technology, it is
essentially worthless. Dell learned this lesson personally in 1989 when it was saddled with a
huge inventory of memory chips that lost their value almost overnight as chip capacity
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jumped from 256K to 1 megabyte. The subsequent sell-off of the memory chips depressed
earnings to such an extent that Dell only earned a penny a share for that quarter. It turned
out to be a blessing in disguise however because that one incident was enough to convince
Dell that improving the speed of their inventory flow was not only a winning strategy, but a
necessity. (2)
The ability to adapt to rapid technological change, to be responsive to customers, and to
operate with low levels of inventory, are the keys to being competitive in the computer
hardware industry today. While all of the major competitors in this realm are striving to
achieve these basic goals, it is clear that Dell Computer Corporation is leading the pack into
the 21' century.
2.2 COMPANY HISTORY
Dell Computer Corporation, headquartered in Round Rock, Texas, is the world's leading
direct computer systems company. Michael Dell, now the computer industry's longest-
tenured chief executive officer, founded the company in 1984. The premise behind the
company was simple - by selling computer systems directly to the customer, Dell could best
understand their needs, and efficiently provide the most effective computing solutions to
meet those needs.
From its meager beginnings in Texas, Dell Computer Corporation expanded to add
international sales offices in 1987 and in 1988 the company started selling to government
agencies and added a sales force to serve larger customers. That year Dell went public. The
company began its short stint in the retail market in 1990 by letting Soft Warehouse
Superstores (now CompUSA) and office supply chain Staples sell its PCs at mail-order
prices. Also in 1991, Dell opened a plant in Limerick, Ireland. In 1992, Xerox agreed to sell
Dell machines in Latin America. Dell opened subsidiaries in Japan and Austria in 1993 and
in 1994 the company exited its retail store strategy to focus on its mail-order origins. In
1996, Dell ramped up operations in the Pacific Rim and, the following year, it entered the
market for workstations and built up its consumer business by separating that operation
from its small-business unit and launching a leasing program for individuals. Continuing its
global expansion, Dell opened a plant in China in 1998 and made plans for a manufacturing
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and customer center in Brazil (opened in 1999.) Also in 1999, Dell made its first acquisition
by buying ConvergeNet Technologies, a California-based maker of storage area network
equipment, in a $340 million deal. (3)
Today, Dell is the number 2, and fastest growing, among all major computer systems
companies worldwide, with more than 36,500 employees around the globe. The company
ranks number 1 in the United States, where it is a leading supplier of PCs to business
customers, government agencies, educational institutions, and consumers. (4)
2.3 DIRECT AT DELL
Articles and case studies have been written about it. Benchmarking studies have been
performed on it. Classes have been taught on it. Many a manager has tried to implement it.
What is it that has garnered this much attention... ? The Dell Direct Model. What started as
a basic concept to deal directly with the customer has turned into the latest of trends in
manufacturing strategy.
Dell's award winning products and customer service, industry-leading growth and
consistently strong financial performance differentiate the company from its competitors.
At the heart of those characteristics is Dell's unique direct-to-customer business model.
"Direct" refers to the company's relationships with its customers, from consumers to the
world's largest corporations. There are not retailers or other resellers adding unnecessary
time and cost, or diminishing Dell's understanding of customer expectations. Specifically,
Dell excels in the following areas:
Primfor Peformane - With their efficient manufacturing and distribution process, Dell offers
its customers powerful products at competitive prices.
Custacniztion - Every Dell coniputer is built to order to fulfill customer needs and
requirements.
Latest Technology - Because of streamlined operations, Dell is able to introduce the latest
technology more rapidly than its competitors. Inventory is kept to a minimum, reducing the
holding costs and the chance of obsolescence.
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Servie and Support - Dell uses direct contact with the customer to improve operations and the
overall customer experience.
Shareholder Value - Since Dell's initial public offering in 1988, its stock has appreciated more
than 40,000 percent. (4)
These strategies have allowed Dell to build one success upon another on its way to
becoming one of the most admired manufacturing companies in the world. In the following
pages it will be determined just how this framework for success can be used to alleviate one
of the most prevalent issues for manufacturing companies - the hockey stick demand skew.
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3 THE HOCKEY STICK PHENOMENON
3.1 GENESIS OF THE HOCKEY STICK
Invariably when you step onto the manufacturing floor of a company at the end of a week,
month, or quarter, you will find people scurrying about in a hurried state, overtime will be
rampant, and deep lines will cover the forehead of almost every employee. What triggers
this hectic, stressful pace? What makes an organization turn from a fine-tuned operation
into a chaotic melee? What causes people to stock up on their antacid supply at such regular
intervals? The culprit of all of these tribulations - the hockey stick demand skew.
The hockey stick is a phenomenon that is so common to manufacturing companies that it is
expected and accepted as a way of life. It is an issue that is pervasive across companies,
regardless of their size, product line, or structure. The hockey stick is characterized by a
sluggish start to the sales cycle, with demand gradually creeping up throughout the time
period, and finally finishing off with a colossal spike at the end, sending the organization into
a tailspin of activity. Figure 1 below demonstrates this phenomenon.
Figure 1 - Hockey Stick Representation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Week
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There is no evidence to suggest that such activities are simply a result of externalities beyond
the control of the organizations in question. Rather, they are created within each business
and industry and, therefore, a remedy should exist to eliminate them. In the following
sections the ways in which such issues have been dealt with in the past, the consequences of
such behaviors, and the contributors to the hockey stick will all be examined.
3.2 TRADITIONAL MEANS OF DEALING WITH THE HOCKEY STICK
Prior to the Japanese system of Just-In-Time (JIT), the primary method for meeting sales
demand was inventory. The delivery lead times were not dependent on manufacturing lead
times, but on the amount of time necessary to pull a unit out of stock and ship it to the
customer. The introduction of JIT systems brought awareness to the actual cost of holding
inventory, which was much higher than originally thought.
Perhaps one reason why this issue demands so much attention is the prevailing belief that
the primary focus of competition in many industries is shifting from quality to time-based
factors (8, 9, 10, 11, 12). Steele and Papke-Shields (13) investigate capacity slack as a
strategic alternative to lead time. The results show excellent delivery reliability, short lead
times, and low inventory levels. However, they point out that the value of capacity slack
may require a longer term view because of the future revenue that is necessary to offset the
current cost of capacity slack. Atwater and Chakravorty (8) validate the use of protective
capacity as a means to achieving shorter lead times, more reliable performance, and better on
time delivery of products, while operating with less inventory. They recognize that adding
protective capacity is not always economically or physically feasible. However, the authors
stress that managers should assess the cost of adding protective capacity versus the savings
in inventory carrying costs, as well as the benefit associated with being responsive to
customer needs.
Today, most facilities still struggle with this issue of how to handle demand fluctuations and
most still utilize the same two methods - inventory management and burst capacity. These
approaches, as well as the concept of simply increasing lead times and building queues, will
be discussed in the following sections.
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3.2.1 Inventory Management
Perhaps the most common method of dealing with predictable demand spikes that tend to
occur each quarter is through inventory management. With this solution, an organization
will try to forecast the projected demand and will produce product before it is needed and
then store it until a need arises from the customer. The general strategy here is to utilize
manufacturing capacity during slow periods by building products ahead of schedule. Then
when the demand spike hits, part of the demand can be met with warehoused product, thus
mitigating the immediate manufacturing impact of the peak demand volumes.
The issues that are created with this type of solution are the problems faced by all
organizations that choose to hold inventory for one reason or another. There is first the
simple inventory carrying costs associated with the storage of finished goods. At this point
in the production of a product, the greatest possible value has been added to the unit and the
time and money spent to produce it is receiving no return. The simplest way to quantify the
cost of carrying inventory is simply to consider what value the money that is tied up in
inventory would have if it could be put to other uses. This equates to the rate of return that
could be expected if the funds could be invested elsewhere. Such inventory carrying costs
have received increased attention in recent years as manufacturing organizations have begun
to realize just how much of their capital is engaged in inventory holdings.
In addition to simple inventory carrying costs, there is also the problem of inaccurate
product mix forecasting and the resultant obsolescence of products. By producing products
before having an order in hand from the customer, a firm assumes the risk of producing the
right products in the wrong quantities, or simply the wrong products altogether. The
accuracy of demand forecasting is another topic entirely, so for the purpose of this work, we
will assume that such forecasts are somewhat less than perfect. Given this assumption, it
stands to reason that products will be produced that will not be consumed by the customer
as predicted. In the best-case scenario, this leads to the incurrence of additional inventory
carrying costs as the product sits on the shelf before finally being sold in a later time period
when an order does come through for a particular product specification. In the worst-case
scenario, the product is never in demand from the customer and it must be disposed of in
some way. Most often, the products are discarded and written off as a loss. This loss
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includes the materials and labor required to produce the product as well as the inventory
carrying costs associated with the time the unit spent in storage. In some situations, the
product may be disassembled and the parts reused to prevent a complete loss. However,
even in such cases, there are still the labor costs associated with the production and
disassembly as well as the inventory carrying costs that were incurred while the product sat
on the shelf in storage.
So while producing products ahead of schedule and storing them until they are needed may
seem to be a nice solution to combat demand spikes, the cushion it provides may not be as
beneficial as expected due to the additional costs associated with the practice. It also may
not provide the anticipated protection from the spike if forecasts fail to predict the
appropriate product mix. In such cases, manufacturing may still be left scrambling to
produce the necessary products demanded by the customer at the end of the time period.
3.2.2 Queues
A second way that peak demand periods have been handled in the past is the use of queues,
or simply requiring the customer to wait longer when demand is greater. While this is
perhaps the simplest means by which to deal with the issue, it is in many cases also the most
impractical. Given that the hockey stick is generally caused by a need to meet a volume or
revenue metric, the idea of making the customer wait and not shipping the product is in
direct opposition and therefore would rarely be used in such a scenario.
However, some organizations that are segmented and siloed into different functional areas
may suffer from this problem. If the sales and manufacturing areas are not well integrated,
the sales group may respond to their organizational metrics and therefore deliver a large
volume of sales late in the quarter without regard to the capacity or capability of the
manufacturing organization to produce and ship those sales. In such a case, if the
manufacturing area has no excess capacity, then there will be no choice but to extend lead
times and increase the response time to the customer. This may often lead to missed
customer and sales expectations and is generally a result of a misalignment of goals and
objectives within the firm.
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Other than this discreet, non-strategic use of queues, it is rare that queuing methods would
be used to deal with a hockey stick demand issue.
3.2.3 Burst Capacity
Finally, the third method most used to combat the hockey stick demand phenomenon within
manufacturing organizations is the use of burst capacity. Supporters of this strategy
maintain that it is more productive to have unused capacity available in the event of a
demand spike rather than to try predict demand before it happens. This capacity includes
the physical manufacturing capacity, the necessary labor, and a deep supply base that can
rapidly respond to increases in customer demand.
The concept of protective capacity is not a new one. Japanese managers have been using
excess capacity instead of inventory to protect their system output for years. Krajewski et al.
(6) found that Japanese managers allowed between 12% and 18% capacity slack in their
production systems. One of the reasons that managers operating under a JIT strategy use
protective capacity is to avoid the need for excess inventory. Excess capacity allows
inventory requirements to decrease while maintaining the desired customer service level.
Monden (7) contends that JIT based production lines must be capable of shifting capacity up
or down by as much as 10%. However, this excess capacity must be present throughout the
entire supply chain if it is to be effective. The actual replenishment time must be less than or
equal to the required lead-time or an inventory build up will be needed at some point in the
chain, producing a hybrid system of inventory and burst capacity utilization.
It may be thought that a lean manufacturing system or TPS based operation would be
capable of handling increased demand. Under the system implemented at Toyota, the
production system is designed with the flexibility to be able to respond to modest changes in
demand. By changing the takt time for an operation, the number of parts per unit time can
be increased or decreased to match customer demand. However, such a flexible design is
constructed to handle minor fluctuations in product demand, not the huge swings associated
with an end of quarter production spike. Therefore, even with an operation that utilizes lean
manufacturing principles, additional burst capacity would still be necessary to handle hockey
stick issues.
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3.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOCKEY STICK
The consequences of the hockey stick tend to be quite severe and ripple through the entire
organization. The first, and most evident, consequence is perhaps also the one that is most
often dismissed or ignored. This is the impact that the hockey stick has on the workload
throughout the organization at the end of the time period. This issue is most evident within
the manufacturing realm where overtime and weekends are standard issue at the end of the
quarter. However, other tertiary pieces of the organization are also affected including
production planning, logistics, sales, and order processing to name a few. The activity spikes
within these functional areas may or may not align in time due to delays and lags in the
organizational processes, but the spikes occur at some point nonetheless. The real issue is
the impact that these high intensity times have on the organization. In general, it causes
employees to spend a greater number of hours at work and results in higher levels of stress
while the employee is at work. This can have an impact on employee morale as well as on
the diligence with which an employee performs his/her job. These are serious issues, which
should not be ignored.
There are several other concerns, which result from the hockey stick; many of which have to
do with increased costs. Regardless of how an organization is structured, whether an
organization is direct or indirect, lean or fat, additional costs will be incurred due to a hockey
stick demand pattern. Many of these costs are obvious such as the additional labor costs
associated with paying employees for overtime late in the quarter while those same
employees are underutilized at the start of the quarter. Other obvious costs include the need
to expedite orders late in the quarter and the resultant shipping costs that are incurred to do
so, the inventory holding costs that are accrued if an organization uses an inventory
management strategy to combat the hockey stick, and the increased capital costs of
maintaining additional physical capacity that will allow for an end of period ramp up. Other
cost issues may include the cost of a decrease in quality performance that results from
hurried activities at the end of the time period as well as the costs of hiring and/or training
employees if a flexible workforce policy is being used.
Even if revenues are such that higher costs can be disregarded, there are operational troubles
associated with the hockey stick that may prove difficult to overcome for some
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organizations. Additional spot capacity is necessary, either to produce on demand or to
store on demand. Whether this additional capacity is used for greater manufacturing
capability or increased warehouse space, it may become difficult to keep up with or to justify
these requirements since they are utilized for only a fraction of the time during the quarter.
A similar capacity issue arises in the area of human resources. Personnel are even more
difficult to manage than physical plant capacity because they generally do not react well to
extended periods of tedium followed by bursts of activity and overwork. Companies must
find ways to usefully occupy the employees during the slow periods, while giving them the
resources to perform at maximum productivity during the peak times. This is not an easy
task. Some companies choose to deal with this issue through the use of temporary
employees. However, this is rarely a perfect solution either. In addition to the
administrative difficulties associated with the hiring, training, and subsequent release of
employees, there is also a certain quality stigma associated with the use of temporary
employees, which may impact the perception of the product with customers in the market.
One other point to consider in today's overheated economy is the fact that additional human
resource capacity may not be readily available at the drop of a hat. Many companies are
finding that they must plan and schedule any increase in human resource capacity weeks or
months in advance if they are to have any hope of acquiring the necessary talent. Once this
talent is on board, companies may be reluctant to let it go, which leads us back to our initial
problem of how to utilize the workforce throughout the quarter, valleys, peaks, and all.
Another consequence to consider is an increased likelihood of failing to meet customer and
fiscal expectations. Because so much of the total sales volume is produced during one
period of time in the quarter any disturbance during that time period could prove disastrous.
Whether this disturbance is in the form of a supplier shortage, a natural disaster, an
information technology crash, or some other catastrophe, the result is the same - a large
portion of the production will not be able to be shipped in a timely fashion. This
phenomenon of having all of one's eggs in one basket is in contrast to a level demand
schedule where a single disturbance would disrupt a much smaller portion of the sales
demand curve.
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A related issue applies to the placement of the demand spike within the quarter. A large
peak in the early or middle part of the quarter would be much less risky than the typical end
of quarter hockey stick. If the demand spike were to occur earlier, then an organization
could respond to a disturbance such as those mentioned previously in a much easier manner
because there would still be time left in the quarter to make up the difference. However,
when disaster strikes in the final week of a quarter, there is little left that can be done to
mitigate the circumstances. With no time to make up the difference, customer orders will
not be shipped on time and financial performance will suffer as a result of missed stock
market expectations.
When one considers these primary consequences of the hockey stick, it becomes clear that it
is quite a list of issues that must be addressed. Increased costs, employee and capacity issues,
as well as the risks associated with such a demand skew, provide a compelling impetus for
action in regards to the hockey stick demand issue.
3.4 CONTRIBUTORS TO THE HOCKEY STICK
Given the serious and widespread consequences of the hockey stick demand skew, it is a
subject that has garnered much interest within companies and the academic realm alike. The
general conclusion of studies in the area has been that it is a rampant problem, which is
inherent to the structure of organizations. In most cases, it has therefore been concluded
that it is a problem that is difficult, or impossible, to solve without a complete revamp of
operations and practices within a firm. This revamp is seen to be so severe within most
firms that management will almost always seek to minimize the impact of the issue rather
than deal with the true root causes.
What are these root causes that steer companies away from addressing them head on? There
are many contributors throughout all levels of an organization. At the manufacturing level,
the demand peak is a result of the way products are scheduled through the facility. If the
Production Planning department within a company utilizes a weekly schedule, or if
production teams are given weekly quotas, one can be assured that Friday will be a very busy
day. At the customer level, the sales system within an organization is also a likely
contributor to this issue. If the Sales Department releases orders on a bi-weekly basis, most
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of the production activity can be expected to occur at the end of the second week. If the
sales teams are given monthly quotas to attain, it is likely that the last week of the month will
see a significant upswing in sales. Even at the highest levels of an organization, executive
reaction to the current state of the business can also be a noteworthy contributor to this
scenario. If the end of a fiscal quarter is approaching and financial performance appears to
be a bit sluggish, it is likely that an extra surge of encouragement will emanate from the
executive ranks with the purpose of stimulating action throughout the business.
To complicate the situation even further, it is likely that all of these root causes are existent
and compounding across various organizational layers, both internal and external to the
company. In the case of a sales environment where various distributors, retailers, and other
channel forms are used, sales release dates and quotas are cumulative throughout each level
of the chain and simply build upon one another to compound the problem. Similar
complexity issues can be found in the supply base and throughout the managerial hierarchy
within a company. The more layers involved in a process, the more extreme the hockey
stick and its detrimental consequences.
Throughout the many varied and diverse organizational behaviors and responses that
contribute to the hockey stick, one common theme continues to surface in regards to the
true origin of the hockey stick demand phenomenon. It always comes back to how
incentives are structured within a company.
Organizations tend to establish goals and objectives that require a certain quantity objective
to be reached within a given time period. Incentives may be based upon total production
units, sales revenues, product margins, or any of a number of criteria. Within the
organization, every group has quarterly and annual goals. Production areas have weekly
targets. Production planning often only offers up weekly ship dates. Sales teams have
quarterly quotas. The entire organization is driven to meet financial objectives. Due to the
nature of business, a firm is always pushed to ship out products before the books close at a
set point in time. In market driven companies, this thrust occurs at the end of the fiscal
quarter when the company's earnings and revenue values are released. Whether a company
has been running behind schedule throughout the quarter and is hurrying to catch up, or
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whether the company is on schedule and is trying to pull additional sales in at the end of the
quarter, the end result is the same - a large push of sales and production at quarter-end in an
attempt to make the financial position look as positive as possible.
So if companies have a certain quantity that must be reached in a certain time period, why
does that necessarily produce a hockey stick demand skew? The answer lies in a behavior
pattern that has been characterized as the "Student Syndrome" (5). This term is used to
describe the natural tendency of procrastination. Students who are given an assignment and
a necessary completion date readily exhibit this characteristic as they continuously delay
completing the assignment until just before it is due. Students will estimate the amount of
time necessary to complete the assignment and get the necessary grade. Once this time has
been negotiated, the student often gets caught up working on other projects with closer
deadlines. When they have only the expected duration time left until the deadline, they really
ramp up their effort level. At that point, if they encounter an unexpected problem, the
deadline is missed. In organizations, this same tendency is displayed as individuals and
teams will wait until late in the time period before buckling down and producing the required
output.
This phenomenon is at the heart of most hockey stick demand skews. Time and quantity
based incentives are coupled with the Student Syndrome behavior pattern to produce
repeated hockey stick effects throughout an organization. These effects amass throughout a
business's entire value chain in a cumulative fashion, each impacting the next and creating a
larger effect, until the ultimate hockey stick skew results.
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4 THE HOCKEY STICK AT DELL COMPUTER CORPORATION
4.1 THE GENESIS OF THE HOCKEY STICK AT DELL
Even with its many operational successes, Dell is not immune to the hockey stick demand
skew. The entire operation is built around quarterly targets and goals. End of quarter
performance for the business units is the key measure of success and is reflected in the
incentive systems and behaviors within the sales organization. While this intense focus
within the company has been a key impetus for Dell's phenomenal success, it also drives
sales volume swings at quarter end. A lack of inventory and the ability to respond rapidly to
customer demand creates a lean production system whose demand skew closely mirrors that
of sales. This all equates to a business that nimbly responds to everytwist and turn of
demand with which it is presented - a demand that resembles a hockey stick.
4.2 DELL'S RESPONSE TO THE HOCKEY STICK
At Dell, there was really only one choice of how to deal with their hockey stick demand
skew, given the culture and environment. The zero-inventory mindset and policies
precluded the possibility of using inventory management as a potential solution. Dell is a
build to order company that prides itself on being able to ship customer orders within five
days from the receipt of an order. Therefore, the thought of pre-building to a forecast early
in the quarter in order to fulfill sales orders later in the quarter was not feasible. Similarly,
given Dell's commitment to the customer, it was unrealistic to think that the organization
would choose to resort to building queues and increasing lead times. Therefore, Dell reacted
to the situation by utilizing burst capacity within the organization. This has been a
successful strategy at Dell for two primary reasons - it was seen to be the most profitable
alternative and was also the best operational fit for the organization.
4.2.1 Profitability Impact
On the issue of profitability, the costs associated with holding excess inventory throughout
the quarter have already been discussed. Inventory carrying costs and the cost of inaccurate
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forecasts and obsolescence can certainly be detrimental to one's balance sheet. However, at
Dell, there was seen to be an even greater profitability issue - that of falling component
prices throughout the quarter.
When one examines the cost structures for high tech companies, the primary cost driver is
the cost of goods sold. While internal manufacturing costs are certainly still critical to these
organizations, the fact that much of the total cost of a unit can be attributed to components
that are produced externally creates an environment where materials costs are the
preeminent drivers for the total cost scenario.
Dell therefore focused greatly upon the cost of goods sold when analyzing its margin
potential. With little or no raw material inventory to clog the supply channels, Dell was able
to pay the current market price for these raw materials, creating an incentive to produce and
ship units when component prices were at their lowest levels. For Dell, this low cost level
for component prices was seen to occur late in the quarter due to the rapid rate of product
improvement within the high tech industry. As more advanced products and processes were
developed, the highly competitive nature of the business kept component prices on a
constant and steady decline. Thus, for Dell, the best margins could be achieved late in the
quarter when component costs were least expensive. This increased the incentive to simply
react to increased demand late in the quarter rather than to produce items early in an attempt
to build up a supply of finished goods.
Another cost aspect of Dell's operation that has allowed for a successful implementation of
a burst capacity strategy in the past is the low cost of capital for its physical plant capacity
when compared to the costs of the alternatives to dealing with the hockey stick demand
skew. As a final assembly operation, the physical requirements for additional capacity in a
Dell facility consist of supplementary hardware such as conveyor lines, assembly stations,
and simple tooling. The cost of such items is minimal when compared to the cost of
holding inventory and of increased component prices.
- 30 -
I4.2.2 Operational Impact
From an operational perspective, the nature of Dell's activities also created a nice fit for a
burst capacity model. The use of the Direct Model creates a great deal of flexibility on the
shop floor. The lean manufacturing system in use at Dell allows for an adjustment in takt
time to suit the customer requirements. The system is able to speed up or slow down
production velocity, or units per hour, simply by increasing the pace at which items flow
through the system. The bounds of this flexibility include human resources and an ultimate
physical capacity. The physical capacity issue has already been discussed, leaving the subject
of a flexible work force as a potential capacity limitation.
Again, flexibility is truly the key to confronting this potential constraint at Dell where the
workforce is continually cross-trained throughout the entire organization. This training
prepares an associate to perform any of a variety of positions and roles within the
manufacturing environment. However, the flexibility does not end within the walls of a
single production facility. By creating a system of similar processes across all of the
manufacturing sites within a given geographic region, Dell also has the processes in place
with which to transfer employees from one product line to another in order to best meet
customer demand requirements. Therefore, an employee may one day be working at his or
her home facility building the Optiplex line of desktop computers, and then the next day
may be down the street kitting parts for a workstation or portable computer.
Another practice that gives Dell additional human resource flexibility is the employment of a
temporary work force during critical times in the demand cycle. The use of temporary labor
is again feasible due to the adaptable manner in which Dell utilizes its production associates.
While the final assembly workforce is highly skilled and fully trained, the entry-level role for
a Dell associate requires skills that can be obtained in a very short time period. Therefore,
with its cross-trained workforce, Dell's full time employees may work in the low skill-level
jobs during periods of decreased demand before transitioning into the more highly skilled
positions when demand peaks and temporary employees are brought in to staff the entry
level positions. Dell is sensitive to the fact that it needs to maintain a large permanent
workforce to preserve its stringent quality objectives as well as a sense of stability. The
company also realizes the potential detrimental effects on the Dell image if too great a
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portion of the workforce is not part of its highly trained team. Therefore, Dell has
maintained a sense of balance in its workforce and still employs a great majority of its labor
force on a permanent basis, utilizing the temporary personnel on an as-needed basis only.
4.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOCKEY STICK AT DELL
Given the profitability and operational impact of the burst capacity strategy, it seemed to be
the perfect solution to the hockey stick issue at Dell. However, several issues have recently
arisen to call this strategy into question. The impact of the hockey stick on profitability first
came under greater scrutiny due to concerns over the marginal costs associated with the
increased manufacturing activity at the end of the quarter. Specifically, the true costs of the
labor and the capacity required to deal with the hockey stick spike were questioned, as well
as the perceived increase in logistical costs associated with the expediting activity that
occurred during this peak demand. With these increased costs, the question was posed as to
whether the decrease in component prices was still great enough to justify current behaviors.
Alongside the issue of profitability were growing concerns about the ability of manufacturing
to sustain the current hockey stick pattern in Dell's environment of incredible growth. As
sales reached higher and higher, the gap between production in month one and production
in month three increased at a similar pace. Was it still feasible to hold excess physical
capacity at such a magnitude? And with an overheated U.S. economy, would the excess
temporary workforce still be capable of handling Dell's increasing end of quarter swell?
One final issue that arose in response to the hockey stick was a concern over the risks
involved with having so much of the demand volume present at the end of the quarter. One
risk that is a concern to the organization is the fact that the more sales occur at the end of
the quarter, the less visibility the company has as to how it is performing throughout the
quarter. Another problem is the dual risk associated with external disturbances. The fact
that so much demand occurs at any one time means that a large portion of the production
volume would be susceptible to a major disruption at that particular point in the quarter.
This issue becomes even more severe when it is placed at the end of the quarter where there
is no time to recoup losses and catch up on production before the end of the quarterly
reporting period.
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4.3.1 Reduced Profitability
Given these perceived difficulties and their impending increase in magnitude due to Dell's
unprecedented growth rate, a method was sought to further study the hockey stick demand
issue in an attempt to analyze and address these concerns. Upon the collection of the
pertinent historical data from a variety of sources within Dell, we determined that an
optimization model would be of value in determining the optimal demand skew in regards to
profitability. The model was developed not to comprehensively capture all costs, but to
include those costs that would change as the skew of a set quarterly demand volume is
altered. Included in these targeted costs were the major components of labor and materials
costs, as well as the consideration of logistics and capacity costs. Finally, on the revenue
side, sales revenues were included in the model in order to capture the perceived decrease in
product margins at the end of the quarter due to greater incentives to claim sales before the
close of the quarter.
The model is a non-linear program, which is designed to determine the shape of the demand
curve by allocating production volumes into weekly buckets. It is assumed that demand can
moved to any point within the quarter. The total demand is considered to be constant and is
defined by the user according to product mix. The model was formulated for the
Workstation product line and therefore comprises the production of three models of
workstation products, plus one model from the Server product line and an Optiplex product,
both of which are produced on the same production lines as the Workstation units. The
user is queried for the total demand volume for each product group, which is then allocated
across the thirteen weeks of the quarter based upon the cost and revenue optimization for
each possible solution. Additional user queries are also offered and will be described in
detail in the upcoming sections. The optimization was modeled using Lingo software by
Lindo Systems, Inc. and the complete model can be found in Appendix Al with a listing of
the variables in Appendix A2.
The key components and attributes of the model are described more comprehensively in the
following sections.
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4.3.1.1 Increased Labor Costs
Dell's inability to produce along a level demand schedule due to the hockey stick skew
requires the company to utilize its manufacturing labor at lower levels of efficiency than it
might otherwise be able. In Dell's current situation, excess labor capacity is available early in
the quarter, resulting in idle production associates. This shifts to a use of overtime, with the
final workweeks of the quarter sometimes exceeding 60 hours per employee, and the hiring
of temporary workers during the last few weeks of the quarter to meet the demand
requirements. Therefore, there is a constant drive to achieve a three-way balance between
the overtime labor cost, at 1.5 times the standard wage rate per employee; the cost holding
full time labor throughout the quarter; and the cost of increasing the total labor capacity via
the acquisition of additional temporary employees as the need arises throughout the quarter.
In order to calculate the overtime costs, it was first necessary to calculate an accurate build
rate, or the number of systems that could be assembled in a given amount of time. Rather
than simply taking an average number, the historical production data was examined using
analysis of variance techniques to determine which variables significantly impacted the
average build rate. The results of the analysis of variance study are included in Appendix A3.
The first of two significant variables was that of shift type. In other words, the level of
productivity was dependent upon whether the production associates were working a normal
8 hour shift or some type of overtime shift such as a Saturday or a longer weekday.
Therefore, this information was included in the model. The second variable that proved to
have a significant impact on build efficiency was the type of product being produced. The
associates were more or less productive depending on the type of product they were
assembling. This is due to the various levels of complexity involved between the product
lines.
After an understanding of the build rates was developed, these rates were used in the model
to calculate the amount of standard work required to meet the demand requirements. The
model then turns to a look-up table to determine the most optimal combination of shifts to
be worked. This was originally included in the master optimization model, but for the sake
of simplicity, was taken off line. The look-up table was developed from a spreadsheet that
was developed to calculate the optimal shift combinations. This spreadsheet can be found in
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Appendix A4. The spreadsheet basically takes the shift efficiencies into account when
determining how to best schedule the labor force. Once the standard work required to meet
the demand schedule is known, then all of the potential shift combinations that can meet
that requirement are compared and the least-cost alternative is chosen. This least-cost
alternative is then used to allocate overtime costs in the optimization model.
Labor hiring costs were also considered in the model, both for permanent and temporary
production associates. Various hiring and training costs were established through the work
of another intern at Dell in cooperation with the human resources staff at Dell. Therefore,
any differences in pay rates, hiring fees, and benefits are considered in the total cost portion
of the model.
Some of the practical constraints considered in the model were the maximum percentage of
overtime that Dell was willing to ask its employees to work, the maximum percentage of
temporary employees allowed, the maximum rate at which employees could feasibly be hired
and trained, and the maximum demand spike that was palatable to the management team.
The inclusion of such real-world constraints helps to ensure the feasibility of the output
solution.
4.3.1.2 Increased Cost of Goods Sold
Another major component to the optimization model was that of the cost of goods sold.
Again, going into the analysis, it was thought that materials costs were on a constant decline
throughout the quarter and that profitability would therefore be optimized by producing a
great deal of volume near the end of the quarter. However, upon a detailed look at the data
on a weekly basis over a period of six quarters, it became apparent that the supposed cost of
good sold reduction was not accurately perceived.
There were two major revelations that were discovered in the analysis of the cost of goods
sold data. First, while component prices were consistently falling across time at a steady rate,
Dell's use of these components was not consistent. Instead, rather than maintaining the
same line of components within its products and either reducing prices or increasing margins
as the component costs fell, Dell utilized a strategy of continually upgrading its product lines.
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Therefore, as component prices fell, the company would simply switch to a more advanced
technology within the given price range to maintain costs while improving system
performance for the customer. Therefore, the perception that it was most profitable to have
an increased demand for Dell products at the end of the quarter was not necessarily correct.
The second trend that was discovered in the data was that the component costs were not
declining in a constant manner. Rather, there was a repeatable trend in the data that
highlighted three specific weeks during the quarter where costs were notably lower than the
remaining weeks. To verify that an actual pattern was present in the data, an analysis of
variance was performed. In order to normalize the data and remove any noise from long-
term changes in the pricing levels, the analysis was performed using the percent change in
component prices from week to week for the six quarters worth of data. The result was a
significant difference in the percent change in component costs by week. (See Appendix B1
for the analysis of variance results.) In effect, the first week of every month saw a lower
average cost of goods sold than the following weeks in each month. This trend is
represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - Cost of Goods Sold Chart
Percent Change In COGS per Week
m- Cost Delta
After further study, the reason behind this result became apparent. Dell's primary chip
producer gives price reductions at the first of every month. Given that chips constitute one
of the largest spend areas for Dell's products, it intrinsically makes sense that the material
cost curve would follow this lead.
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For a bit more insight into the monthly price reductions that are given by Dell's chip
supplier, there are two points to consider. First, the computer industry does not have a
standard quarter-end. In most industries, if a price break is given to a customer, or group of
customers, the break will most likely occur at the beginning or end of a quarter. This
typically occurs either in conjunction with a large volume increase at the end of the quarter,
or just after the quarter has ended to begin a new pricing scheme for the next quarter. For
the supplier's chip sales, the pricing regime is highly commodotized in that there is little
special pricing to be had for preferred customers. Therefore, one might suspect a single
price reduction around the end of each fiscal quarter. However, in the high-tech industry,
where there is no standard quarter-end and where the end of Dell's quarter lags the ends of
quarter for its competitors by one month, the major chip supplier simply utilizes monthly
price cuts to deal with varying ends of quarter for its diverse customer base.
The second point to consider in this component pricing scenario is that Dell's chip set
supplier is the one supplier with which Dell does not have a substantial position of relative
power. With Dell's other suppliers, a third-party "revolver" is used to hold the inventory
until just hours or days before Dell needs it for its operations. With this strategy, the
suppliers actually maintain the inventory carrying costs until Dell pulls the components from
the third-party revolver. This serves to reduce Dell's costs while allowing it to operate with
little to no inventory. It also allows Dell to utilize just-in-time pricing for its components.
So any price reductions reflected in the industry throughout the quarter, are reflected in
Dell's cost of goods sold. Dell is able to achieve such favorable terms of payment with its
supply base due to its buying power in the industry. It enjoys that buying power with every
supplier except the chip manufacturer. In the case of these chips, Dell must hold more
inventory due to its inability to receive the necessary products just in time. This not only
leads to increased inventory carrying costs on one of its most expensive components, but it
also drives a more static pricing scenario for its chips. Therefore, the total average cost of
goods sold curve for the quarter reflects the substantial price decrease by Dell's major chip
set supplier in the first month of the quarter, while portraying the price fluctuations of the
balance of the supply base throughout the remaining weeks of the quarter.
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These trends in component pricing levels are reflected in the optimization model via the
percent change per week in average cost of goods sold, with a starting point that reflects the
average cost element of a typical Dell system. This starting point is user-defined within the
model, thereby allowing repeated runs of the model at different points in time and with
different base component prices.
4.3.1.3 Decreased Sales Revenue
Once the analysis was complete for the cost of goods sold, the next logical step was to
examine the parallel sales prices for Dell's products to determine whether an actual margin
increase was present in the weeks where component prices were lowest. Again, data was
analyzed for six consecutive quarters and an analysis of variance model was utilized to
determine whether an actual pattern was present in the data. A similar analysis of variance
construction was employed, again identifying a significant difference by week in the percent
change of the average sales revenue per unit across the quarters examined. The resulting
trend is represented in Figure 3. The complete results from the analysis of variance model
can be found in Appendix B2.
Figure 3 - Average Dell Sales Revenue Trend
Percent Change in Price per Week
... rice Delta
The source of these price changes can be traced to the dynamic pricing system used within
Dell's sales organization. This system will be explained in detail in the following chapter.
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These sales revenue levels are again reflected in the optimization model via the percent
change per week in the average revenue per unit, with a starting point that reflects the
average price of a typical Dell system at the start of the quarter. This starting point is also
user-defined within the model in order to allow for repeated runs of the optimization
program for various scenario evaluations.
After determining the cost and revenue components, the next step in the analysis was to
look at the net effect on margins and profitability by analyzing the relationship between the
average weekly component cost per unit and the average weekly sales revenue per unit.
When these patterns were overlaid, it became clear that some correlation existed between the
two. Upon further examination, this intrinsically makes sense due to the wealth of
information available to the Dell sales representatives at the time of a sale. When a customer
requests a quotation for a product configuration, the sales representative has real-time
information available concerning the resultant margin levels via Dell's information
technology infrastructure. Therefore, if the margin level is high, and the customer is hesitant
to make the purchase, the sales representative has the option to decrease the revenue and the
resulting margin within certain bounds. This pricing scenario will be explored in greater
detail in a later chapter, but for now it can be assumed that there is a definite cause and
effect relationship between the component costs for a particular configuration and the
resultant quoted sales price for that unit.
With that said, the question becomes whether this is a zero-sum game. Is the net difference
between the decrease in the cost of goods sold and the decrease in the sales revenue always
consistent? Is any advantage gained by selling at one period in the quarter verses another?
The answer is determined by looking at the net percent change in margin over the same six
quarter time period. When the change in component prices is netted from the change in
sales revenue, it becomes clear that the benefit of producing during the first week of every
month remains. This is evident in Figure 4 and Figure 5 below, which represent the overlay
of the percent change in cost and revenue by week and the net change in margin by week.
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Figure 4 - COGS and Revenue Comparison
Figure 5 - Gross Margin Pattern
This net gain can be understood when one considers the dynamics of the sales process.
Again, this will be covered in greater depth in a following chapter, but the basics are as
follows. When margins are above normal due to decreased component pricing, the sales
representative has the opportunity to decrease the sales price and resultant revenue and
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Price Delta vs. Cost Delta
.Pice Delta
Cost Delta
margin in order to make a sale. However, this strategy may or may not be necessary,
depending on the price elasticity of the particular customer. Therefore, on average, the
margin per unit will be greater than if the component prices had not fallen and will lie
somewhere on the continuum between the base margin allowable and the optimum margin
potential. This resultant margin will occur during weeks where component prices are lower
than average. However, in weeks where the component prices are at or above average, the
sales representative will have less room to negotiate and the average margin available will be
reduced. Therefore, a net margin gain is available when component prices are reduced. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6 - Representation of Net Margin Gain
Average Net Margin
The conclusion of this analysis is that despite the fact that Dell pricing follows the cost of
goods sold for a product, the net margin will nonetheless be increased when component
prices are at their lowest. As a result, both component costs and sales revenues were
included in the optimization model.
4.3.1.4 Decreased Logistics Revenue
Another area that appeared to be impacted by the hockey stick demand skew from a cost
perspective was the logistical costs for both inbound and outbound freight. The perception
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was that freight costs were increased due to a large increase in expediting fees. On the
inbound side, there were various examples of expedite fees that were required to deliver the
necessary raw materials in the appropriate time frame at the end of each quarter. Outbound
logistical costs were thought to increase at the end of the quarter due to the increased drive
to meet commitments to customers before the bell tolled.
Data was difficult to come by in exploring these logistical issues, especially on the inbound
side. While there was documentation to prove that a jet had been chartered here or there for
inbound parts, these costs were sporadic at best and certainly not repeatable. In addition,
the costs associated with such expediting activities were typically an order of magnitude
lower in value than some of the other costs associated with the hockey stick. Due to this
relative low value, and the fact that a typical quarterly cost would be difficult to estimate,
these inbound logistics costs were not included in the model.
Perhaps a more critical cost category on the inbound side was the additional internal
administrative and logistical effort that was exerted at quarter end. The momentum that is
achieved at the end of each quarter is something that is phenomenal to witness. This is
especially evident in the area of logistical support. Parts and products and finished goods are
shifted here, there, and everywhere in an attempt to meet every possible order. However,
most of this additional labor is not captured and therefore was not able to be estimated for
the model.
The one area where logistical data was available was on the outbound side. Information
from one of Dell's central databases was captured and sorted to determine the shipping
method used for each unit shipped as well as the respective cost and revenue received for
each item. This data was analyzed over the course of the quarter, with some unanticipated
results. It was expected that shipping costs would increase at quarter end due to the number
of orders that were expedited. However, the data revealed that while the cost per unit
remained relatively stable throughout the quarter, the logistics revenue per unit actually
decreased. This phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
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Figure 7 - Quarterly Logistics Revenue Trends
Figure 8 - Logistics Revenue Margin
After considering this result and discussing it with both the sales and logistics groups, an
interesting behavior pattern emerged. It seems that while the sales representatives have only
a specified amount of room to negotiate on price and reduce margins in an attempt to make
a sale, one lever that they can still negotiate is the cost of shipping for a customer.
Therefore, if it comes down to making or breaking a sale, the sales representatives actually
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have the ability to "give away" shipping and not charge the customer for the logistics costs if
it will increase the probability of capturing the sale.
Such a give-away of free shipping is not necessarily a sanctioned action, but it occurs
nonetheless. As a result, the revenues associated with sales made at the end of the quarter
are reduced when compared to those made earlier in the quarter. The true question for the
purpose of the model then becomes whether this pattern will follow the demand spike if it is
experienced elsewhere in the quarter. While such behavior patterns and drivers of the
hockey stick demand skew will be discussed in a later chapter, some assumptions were made
for purpose of the optimization. The fact that this is a reactionary behavior pattern makes
future actions difficult to predict, but it has been assumed that even if the demand skew is
altered considerably throughout the quarter, there will still always be a push to squeeze out
last-minute sales for the quarter. Therefore, given the pattern apparent in the data, the
model assumes that this free shipping phenomenon is time period specific within the quarter
and that logistics revenue will decrease towards the end of the quarter.
4.3.1.5 Increased Capacity Costs
Capacity costs were determined based upon the recent start-up costs of two of Dell's
manufacturing facilities. The time value of these costs were considered in that if the
maximum demand exceeded the current capacity level, then additional facilities would need
to be constructed in order to meet this demand. However, due to the fact that the model
only explores a single time period, it does not calculate those costs that would be associated
with delaying the construction of a facility for one or more quarters. Instead, these costs
were contemplated off-line and were taken into account in the final sales skew
recommendation that is made in a later section.
These five profitability drivers, labor costs, materials costs, sales revenues, logistics revenues,
and capacity costs, were all included in the non-linear program optimization model. The
results of the model will be discussed in the following chapter. However, before proceeding
to that analysis, the final two consequences associated with Dell's current hockey-stick
practices will be discussed.
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4.3.2 Imminent Capacity Limitations
In addition to a potential detrimental effect on profitability, Dell's burst capacity strategy has
had a tremendous impact on the efficiency of its operational activities. These inefficiencies
can be divided into two main categories that are becoming increasingly difficult to manage
due to the extreme growth of the company. The first issue involves the availability of
manufacturing capacity at the magnitude that is required for Dell activities. This issue of
capacity availability and management is a concern both internally within Dell as well as
externally in their supply base. The second matter to be discussed is the availability of
human resource capacity. This issue is magnified not only by Dell's expected sales growth,
but also by the current state of the U.S. economy and the resultant overheated employment
market.
4.3.2.1 Manufacturing Capacity Issues
In the past, Dell has chosen to follow a strategy in which additional manufacturing facilities
continue to be built in order to keep up with demand. This strategy has included the
establishment of sufficient capacity to manage the end of quarter spikes that are seen within
the industry. As mentioned previously, such a strategy seemed to be the best course of
action due to the fact that the cost of additional manufacturing facilities, and even the cost
of manufacturing, is ultimately much lower than the materials costs in the industry, which
were thought to be minimized during the demand peak at quarter end. However, even
without considering the cost issues involved, it has become increasingly more difficult for
Dell's manufacturing organization to operate in such a manner.
Over the past several years, Dell has grown into a very large company with sales that dwarf
what was seen in times past. However, while sales have increased, the quarterly demand
pattern has remained relatively stable, continuing to result in a hockey stick skew. When
these two scenarios are combines - increased sales plus a constant hockey stick pattern - the
end result is an ever-increasing gap in the sales and production volumes from the start to the
end of the quarter, as illustrated below in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 - Widening Hockey Stick Gap at Dell
This phenomenal growth at Dell has only begun. Sales growth is projected to continue on
an extreme upward trend in the upcoming years, leading Dell to answer the question of
whether or not the company can continue to deal with the hockey stick demand skew in the
same manner. What now requires excess manufacturing capacity early in the quarter will, in
the future, require excess manufacturing facilities to handle the end of quarter demand spike.
This situation is not only a cause for concern within Dell, but there are also questions as to
whether the supply base can continue to operate in the same erratic fashion. In the past,
most suppliers have held additional inventory in order to provide Dell with the necessary
raw materials during times of peak demand because their replenishment times were greater
than the required lead times. By combining finished goods inventory with some extent of
burst capacity, most suppliers have been able to meet Dell's demand spikes in the past.
However, this is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve.
While the supply base has some degree of "demand smoothing" due to the aggregation of
several customers and the staggered end of quarter periods for those customers, there is still
an burden placed upon these suppliers when Dell's volumes shoot up so rapidly. And while
Dell's cost structure allows for the construction of additional manufacturing sites at a
relatively low cost to the company, this is certainly not the case for the supply base. Many of
Dell's suppliers have very capital-intensive operations, which makes the inefficient use of
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capacity quite costly. In addition, due to the costly nature of expansionary activities, the
supply base could not easily bring up new production facilities in an attempt to increase
capacity. Therefore, the high costs associated with new supplier facilities and the inefficient
use of such facilities make for a supply base that is not as flexible as Dell's internal
operations. This leads to a solution of higher inventory levels for the supply base, which
serves to increase costs.
These manufacturing capacity concerns, both internally wihin Dell externally in their supply
base, are issues that need careful consideration as Dell continues its monumental growth
trend. Operating within the confines of the hockey stick demand skew will not only create
additional costs for the organization as it continues to grow, but creates an approach that
takes more effort to sustain. Therefore, Dell would benefit from taking an active role in
carefully reviewing the capacity planning strategies of both its own organizations and those
within its supply base.
4.3.2.2 Human Resource Issues in Manufacturing
Akin to the physical capacity issue at Dell is a growing concern surrounding the availability
of human resources within the manufacturing realm at the end of a quarter. In the past, Dell
has maintained a steady permanent workforce and has complemented these associates with
temporary employees as demand increased late in the quarter. However, with a tightening
labor market, Dell is finding it increasingly difficult to operate in such a fashion.
The law of supply and demand dictates that as qualified and capable employees become
scarcer, the price for such individuals will increase. This increase in price includes premium
working conditions as well as wages for those employees who are most in demand. In such
an environment, Dell must consider the attractiveness of its current operating conditions.
With the current hockey stick scenario, not only is Dell's field of temporary employees being
wooed away by steady full time positions elsewhere, but their entire workforce begins to
question the attractiveness of working 11-hour days and rarely getting to spend Saturdays
with their families at the end of a quarter.
- 47 -
While Dell has taken steps to alleviate potentially extreme measures, such as transitioning
various product lines to the newly established manufacturing facilities in Tennessee, it is
clear that additional changes are necessary if the company is to be able to meet its expected
growth targets. Certainly an alteration of the quarterly demand skew to eliminate the current
peak at quarter-end would be one remedy that bears consideration.
4.3.3 Wall Street Impact
The final prevailing impact of the hockey stick demand skew at Dell can simply be
characterized as increased risk. This risk is relevant in three distinct areas. The first of
which is the financial risk associated with business projections for Wall Street. Dell, like all
public companies, must present quarterly projections to Wall Street analysts at various times
throughout the quarter. The ability of a company to then meet these projections at quarter-
end has a significant impact on their overall stock performance. Therefore, good projections
concerning earnings are critical in determining the value of a publicly traded firm.
Fundamentally, the larger the percentage of total sales revenues that are realized very late in
the quarter, the less information on which the financial group can base their projections.
They certainly have historical performance data and marketing projections to work from, but
a situation where a significant portion of sales were completed before the projections were
made would certainly reduce the margin of error associated with the process.
Another component of the risk scenario associated with the hockey stick demand skew is
operational in nature and involves the simple danger associated with having a sizeable
percentage of the sales volume realized in a single time period. The fear is that disturbances
that may occur during this peak time could impede the company's ability to fulfill sales
orders. Such disturbances could include natural disasters such as an ice storm that would
prevent materials from getting in or out of Dell's facilities, or a catastrophe such as the
earthquake that hit Taiwan in 1999 and interrupted the manufacture of critical materials and
resulted in parts shortages throughout the industry. The issue here is not the risk associated
with natural disasters, because such things will undoubtedly occur, but rather is related to
probability that such a disaster will occur at the most inopportune time when Dell's volumes
are the greatest. If an ice storm hits Dell in November during the first month of their
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quarter, it is not likely to have a serious impact. However, if that same ice storm were to hit
Austin in the last week of January, the company would be impacted tremendously.
Therefore, while the risks associated with unlikely events or natural disasters will never be
completely eliminated, spreading demand more evenly throughout the quarter would at least
mitigate these dangers.
Related to this issue, the final risk element concerns the placement of the demand spike
within the quarter. If the same demand spike was to occur during month two of the quarter,
instead of month three, and something unforeseen arose, then there would still be an
opportunity to "catch up" and recover before the end of the quarter. But with the current
hockey stick skew, all is lost until the following quarter. Any unanticipated disruptions
during the last several weeks will almost surely result in unshipped sales and missed revenue
targets.
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5 OPTIMAL DEMAND SKEW
5.1 OPTIMIZATION MODEL RESULT
These three primary consequences of the hockey stick demand skew - reduced profitability,
operational burdens, and increased financial risks - were taken into account in order to
determine a more optimal demand skew. First, the optimization model was created to
determine the most profitable way to distribute sales across a quarter, and then the
operational and financial risk considerations were taken into account to generate a final skew
recommendation.
In addition to the basic model parameters discussed previously such as sales prices and
labor, materials, capacity and logistics costs, several constraints were included in the model
to more accurately reflect the true situation at Dell.
The results of the optimization model are represented in Figure 10.
Figure 10 - Optimized Demand Skew
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In general, the optimization model shifts the greatest production volumes into weeks 5, 9,
and 10 of the quarter, with additional sales volumes targeted at weeks 1, 6, and 7. Figure 11
points out several key drivers of this demand solution.
Figure 11 - Key Drivers to the Demand Skew
As the chart points out, the decreased material costs associated with weeks 1, 5, and 9 help
to drive large sales volumes into these weeks. Decreased margins and logistics revenues late
in the quarter tend to eliminate large sales swells during this time period. The large volume
of sales present in week 10 can be explained by the increased headcount that is available due
to the increased volume the prior week.
In summary, the optimization results take advantage of the cost of goods sold buying cycle,
the efficient use of labor and overtime, the increase in logistics revenue, and the reduction of
necessary capacity requirements. However, all of these elements are not weighted the same.
Figure 12 shows the increased profit contribution of each factor in relation to the others.
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Figure 12 - Profit Contribution Factors for Proposed Skew
As can be seen, the majority of the profit contribution comes from the change in margins
across the quarterly cycle. In particular, the decrease in COGS is the greatest factor,
followed by the increase in the sales revenue. The labor and logistics costs provide no
significant impact to the final solution.
5.2 RECOMMENDED DEMAND SKEW
In reality, Dell's sales system and customer base will never be so finely tuned that the
optimal skew can be reached with complete accuracy. Therefore, some smoothing of the
optimal curve must occur to make any adherence to it feasible. In addition, given Dell's
situation, a strict adherence to the optimal demand skew would not be the most
advantageous course of action anyway, due to the operational and risk factors involved.
Instead, the recommended quarterly demand skew has three alterations from the proposed
model solution.
The first of these alterations concerns the maximum demand that should be allowed in any
given week. The optimization model suggests that, instead of eliminating the demand spike,
two similar spikes be implemented at different points in time during the quarter. Due to the
operational difficulties and the risk factors that are associated with demand spikes at Dell,
this does not seem to be the ideal situation.
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The model also proposes a sharp decline in sales volumes during the last three weeks of the
quarter. However, common sense suggests that even if sales quotas have been reached late
in the quarter, the sales machine at Dell will not just cease to operate until the start of the
next quarter. Indeed, the entire organization has every incentive to exceed sales targets,
therefore also securing a positive earnings result for Wall Street. In addition, sales
representatives will not simply pack up their bags and go home the minute their quota is
reached. Instead, they will continue to sell in order to take advantage of the lucrative
incentives that can be achieved after one has met his/her targeted quota. The compensation
systems for sales representatives at Dell will be discussed in greater detail in the following
chapter, but for now it is sufficient to note that the sales representatives are compensated
handsomely for exceeding their sales goals. Therefore, the entire organization is enticed to
sell throughout the entire quarterly sales cycle, making an end of quarter slow down quite
unlikely.
The final modification to the sales skew suggested by the optimization model impacts the
projected sales volume for week one. The model proposes that week one have moderately
high sales before experiencing a reduction in sales volumes for weeks two through four.
However, the process by which Dell constructs its quota and incentive system for the sales
organization makes this upswing in week one difficult to achieve. Upon the completion of
any given quarter, each customer-focused business unit will analyze the performance of each
individual sales representative. This performance data is then used to establish the individual
sales quotas for the following quarter. Therefore, given the time that must be taken to
complete this analysis, it is literally impossible to complete it overnight and have it ready on
day one of a new quarter. Similarly, some variable components of the compensation plan
for the sales representatives are not determined until the first few weeks of a given quarter
either. Again, past performance is taken into account as well as marketing projections and
analyses that determine the preferred product mix and volume requirements for the
following quarter. These systemic challenges of incomplete quotas and incentive packages at
the start of the quarter therefore make it difficult to motivate the sales representatives during
the first week. Without a clear direction concerning how much and what types of products
to sell, they are flying blind until the complete incentive plan is released for the quarter. This
typically occurs in week two or three.
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Given these inherent issues, it is clear that the proposed demand skew from the optimization
model needs some further adjustment. Figure 13 illustrates the modifications to the
proposed skew that are suggested based upon these issues and also incorporates a smoother
demand recommendation that will allow for easier labor transitions from week to week.
Figure 13 - Smoothed Demand Solution
This is the proposed demand skew recommendation for Dell. While it would have been
feasible to actually incorporate such constraints into the model, it was decided that these
particular restrictions would be better-introduced offline. This reasoning is based on the fact
that these constraints are based upon qualitative judgments, rather than quantitative facts.
For instance, the desire to continue selling throughout the end of the quarter, even though
quarterly goals and quotas have been reached, is a behavioral item rather than a hard and fast
constraint within Dell's system. Therefore, the it was decided that such items would be
suited to situation-based reasoning rather than quantitative modeling. Figure 14 and Figure
15 display a comparison between the original demand skew and the recommendation to
allow for a comparison of the magnitude of the peak demand volumes.
55 -
0
C
0.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-"
Week
Figure 14 - Original Demand Skew Representation
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Figure 15 - Smoothed Demand Representation
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6 DRIVERS OF THE HOCKEY STICK
6.1 AN INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PHENOMENON?
After determining the optimal demand skew for Dell, the next question to be answered is
how to achieve such results. The first issue is whether the current skew is internally or
externally driven. If the skew were externally driven, one would expect to see a correlation
between Dell's demand skew and competitor's skews and a distinct link with certain events
in the customer base. However, neither of these scenarios can be documented.
All of Dell's major competitors do see large upswings in demand at the end of the quarter;
however, since Dell's quarterly cycle is askew from those of its competitors, these upswings
actually occur at different periods in time. This eliminates the possibility that it's an
industry-wide phenomenon. And while there are occasional swings in demand in a particular
customer segment, such as a large demand spike in the higher education segment in August
when all of the students are going back to school, these do not synchronize with the end of
quarter spike. Such segmental peaks, which are not able to be quantitatively included in this
discussion due to their confidential nature, are invariably muted as they are aggregated with
the demand volumes of the other business segments so that the only continual pattern that is
observed is that of the hockey stick.
These findings suggest that the hockey stick demand skew is driven internally by the
processes and systems in place within the individual computer manufacturers. This author
was fortunate enough to be able to work within two of the customer business segments at
Dell for several months in order to document the sales practices and procedures in an
attempt to identify the heart of the issue at Dell. During this time, several key variables were
identified, which impacted the sales skew within the company. These variables are outlined
below.
6.2 SALES PROCESSES
Within Dell, there are three primary ways to receive an order. First, a customer, whether an
individual or a representative from a business or company, can simply call 1-800-BUY-
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DELL and speak to a general customer service representative to receive a price quote and
place an order. Such a customer also has the option of simply going to the website
www.dell.com where he/she can price various computer configurations, place an order, and
even buy peripherals for their system. In addition, customers from large corporations
typically have a sales representative assigned to them. Some business customers are able to
choose whether to buy over the internet or the phone, but some customer organizations
require their employees or purchasing agents to utilize the Dell sales representative assigned
to them. Regardless, there is always a personal sales representative available to answer
questions, price specific configurations, or provide any additional assistance that the
customer may desire. This sales representative will then receive a commission on any
products that are purchased from a customer on their account, regardless of the method
used to procure the order.
As one might expect, when Dell sales are made without the assistance of a commissioned
sales representative, the demand curve is relatively flat. This is especially true of internet
sales where purchases are literally made at all times of the day and night on a continual basis
throughout the week, month, etc. Spikes may be seen around the holidays or other key
seasons during the year, but most sales are not skewed toward any given point. Intuitively,
this makes sense because you, as a consumer, may be just as likely to purchase a personal
computer at 10:00 PM on a Wednesday night as you are at 9:00 AM on a Saturday morning.
And certainly there are no incentives or drivers that would encourage such customers to
purchase during a particular time of the month or quarter. Therefore, internet sales are
almost entirely flat when aggregated over the whole of the businesses. Likewise, phone sales
that are not performed through a dedicated sales representative are also steady across time.
However, this steady state sales rate does not occur in those business areas where sales
representatives are present in the process. This primarily includes corporate, educational,
and government accounts and constitutes a large portion of Dell's total revenues. The
typical sales process for such accounts is generally completed in two stages - quotations and
order placement.
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The first step in the order acquisition phase is for the customer to place one or more
telephone calls to their dedicated sales representative in order to receive pricing and product
information. This customer may be a central purchasing representative for the business
entity or may simply be an individual within a customer's organization who has the approval
to purchase his or her own computer equipment. Regardless, the first call is generally made
to acquire information on the systems and pricing available.
One of the components that allows Dell's sales teams to be so effective is their use of Dell's
dynamic web-based pricing system. Utilizing the system, the sales representative is able to
enter the specifications for a given computer system configuration, typically starting with a
general product specification and then making alterations to satisfy a customer's individual
needs, and then can view the total costs, the standard pricing, and the percent net margin
that Dell will garner upon the sale of such an item. The sales representative is therefore able
to compare this financial information across various product specifications, allowing him to
provide real-time pricing information to the customer on a limitless number of individual
product specifications. Of course, in addition to providing this value to the customer, the
sales representative is also able to determine which configuration will be most advantageous
for Dell and to his own personal compensation package. These individual incentives will be
discussed in the following section.
After completing the informational telephone conversation, the sales representative will
follow up by faxing or e-mailing quotations to the customer, displaying all of the potential
systems that were discussed during the phone conversation, as well as the respective pricing
information. After receiving an official Dell quote, if the customer is satisfied with the terms
of the offer, a follow-up call will be made to actually place the order. The customer will
inform his sales representative as to which system her prefers, the sales representative will
confirm pricing, and the customer will be asked to fax or e-mail a purchase order to Dell.
Once the sales representative has received the order, it is turned over to order processing
where the purchase is checked for errors and the method of payment is confirmed. Upon
the completion of this process, the order is released to manufacturing.
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6.3 INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
The incentive systems in place for the Dell sales organization is seen to play a major role in
driving the hockey stick demand skew. The structure of the incentive system and the
manner of many of the processes employed throughout the organization has an inadvertent
impact on the ultimate distribution of the demand skew throughout a quarter. This structure
and the processes in use within it are discussed in the following sections.
6.3.1 Compensation System Structure
Dell employs a typical compensation system for its sales representatives, which includes both
a base salary component as well as a commission component. In addition, each business
segment develops a Spiff program for each quarter by which the sales representatives may
receive bonus incentives based upon segment-specific goals throughout the quarter.
6.3.1.1 Base Salary Component
The base salary element of the compensation system is managed in the same manner as all
salaries at Dell. Employees receive annual performance reviews and are objectively reviewed
against the individual goals and objectives, which they helped to establish at the start of the
review year. Employees are eligible for annual raises based upon their accomplishments and
achievement level throughout the year.
6.3.1.2 Sales Commission Component
The commission structure at Dell is similar that within most sales organizations where each
employee is given a quota for the quarter. This quota package is usually distributed by week
two or three of the quarter. These quotas are developed based upon market projections,
earnings considerations, and individual sales performance for the prior quarter. The
timeliness, or lack thereof, of the quota publishing process provides one prevailing reason
for sluggish sales early in the quarter. The sales representatives do not know which
dimensions of the sales scenario will be most generously compensated and therefore are
reluctant to make any sales until the new incentive system is clarified. While such delays are
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seemingly unavoidable, they do help to explain the slow demand pattern seen in month one
of each quarter.
When the quotas are published, two of the compensation components are margin and total
revenue. The sales representatives receive a certain commission on all sales up to their
stated quota level. Once that level is reached, the commission payout increases dramatically.
Therefore, a great incentive exists for those representatives who reach and exceed their
established quota levels.
6.3.1.3 Spiff Program Incentives
The Spiff program that is in place within each business unit is the most flexible piece of the
sales compensation package. The Spiff plan was established to provide an adaptable means
by which to easily incent the sales force within each particular business segment. Each
quarter, the marketing and sales leaders within a given business segment come together to
establish the plan for the following quarter based upon prior sales patterns and performance
levels. Like the sales quotas, the Spiff plans are generally completed in week two or three of
the quarter, providing a similar early sluggishness from the sales teams. Once the Spiffs are
released, changes are frequently made, generally in the form of additional Spiffs as the need
arises to stimulate sales in a particular area or time period.
Spiffs are used to stimulate sales along a multitude of dimensions. They may be established
to drive the sale of a particular product or configuration, a warranty plan, or even a
peripheral component in which Dell has a vested interest. At times, suppliers may even be
allowed to offer a Spiff for the sale of a particular product, such a high-end monitor or a
particular ZIP drive. The Spiff program is also used to drive overall demand during specific
periods of the quarter. This may include trying to drive demand during a historically slow
period such as the week after Christmas, but more typically the Spiffs are used to stimulate
demand at quarter end if the organization is not meeting its earnings goals.
The structure of the individual Spiffs is quite varied from quarter to quarter and across
business segments. However, some common Spiffs are listed in Table 1. (Specifics
concerning these Spiffs is not available due to proprietary issues.)
- 61 -
Table 1 - Common Spiff Programs
Daily Quotas
Pay per Unit
Margin or Revenue Spiff
Varying Pay per Unit
Supplier Spiff
Bundled Spiff
Target levels are set for the average Spiff payout per employee based upon the funds
available in the Spiff budget for each individual business unit. In addition, there is a
maximum cap on the amount of Spiff money that one representative can collect during a
given quarter. For an experienced sales representative, the Spiff program accounts for
approximately 10% of the total compensation package.
6.3.2 The Impact of Incentives on the Hockey Stick
After spending several months working with the sales organization at Dell, it is the
conclusion of this author that the current incentive system has a very significant impact on
the demand skew distribution. While the base salary and commission structures tend to
encourage steady sales across the quarter, the Spiff program generally rewards those who sell
later in the quarter. While the initial Spiff plans that are established each quarter do not
incent the employees in such a manner, behavior patterns emerge as the quarter progress
that ultimately drive the hockey stick demand skew.
One cause for a sluggish start to the quarter has already been established. Another cause is
that Spiff introductions tend to be more heavily weighted towards the end of quarter. Sales
representatives come to know this pattern and respond accordingly. This is primarily
accomplished through delaying the actual acquisition of orders as well as delaying the
processing of orders once they are received. We will review each of these tactics in turn.
In many cases, the timing of an order is variable. A purchasing agent is purchasing a number
of systems for a corporation or public entity on a large purchase order. The exact timing of
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the delivery of those systems is generally not critical to the business, as many of the systems
are employed as replacement units for currently operational systems. Some customers will
even request that shipments not arrive for weeks or months. There are certainly those
customers to whom timing is essential, but most of the sales representatives interviewed
expressed the opinion that a typical order could be pushed in or pulled out by up to three
weeks if it would have a beneficial impact on the net compensation received by the sales
representative.
Often, the customer will be offered some sort of pricing incentive in return for their
willingness to be flexible in terms of delivery dates. Giving the accurate, real-time pricing
information that the sales representatives have at their fingertips via Dell's dynamic pricing
system, they can generally determine whether a slight break in margin or revenue on a
particular sale will result in a net increase in their total compensation if the system is shipped
later in the quarter. In some cases, the Spiff dollars available at the end of the quarter are
substantial enough to motivate the delay of an order.
One other tactic used to prompt customers to delay their orders was illustrated in Figure 7.
As thorough as the sales compensation package is, the logistics revenue received is outside
of the scope of the margin calculation system, and is therefore another tool the sales
representatives can use to shape demand.
Finally, for orders received by fax or e-mail, the sales representative can shape the demand
that manufacturing sees based on when the orders are entered into the system. It is
important to note that such order delay tactics are exercised in complete agreement with all
Dell rules and regulations. The sales representatives are not necessarily acting in a negative
manner while employing these methods, they are simply responding in a way that will
optimize their incentive payout under the current compensation system. If these behaviors
are determined not to be the most optimal for the Dell system, then the incentive system
needs merely to be changed in order to alter the current delay patterns in the sales
organizations.
In addition to the delay tactics used by sales representatives, another significant portion of
the demand upsurge at the end of the quarter simply results from aggressive sales behaviors.
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Just as pricing and logistics breaks are used to delay the placement of orders, they are
likewise used to encourage the early placement of orders that would otherwise not have been
made until the following quarter. It is also common to see the volume of calls made from
sales representatives to customers increase at the end of the quarter in order to stir up
business and longer hours are certainly the norm at this time as well.
6.4 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE METRICS
Related to the incentive systems at Dell, and the methods used to exploit them, is the topic
of margin boundaries. As stated previously, the sales representatives have the option to
reduce the margins slightly in order to capture a sale. However, under normal
circumstances, the latitude given to the sales force in these situations is fairly tightly
controlled. If a sales representative wishes to drop the net margin below the boundary
point, he must seek approval from the Sales Manager in his area. The Sales Manager will
generally take such a request to the financial analyst for the sales unit and discuss the
possibility with him. At this point, two specific aspects are considered when determining
whether the lower pricing option is feasible.
The first consideration is whether Dell will still maintain a positive net margin on the sale.
'While margins may be cut slim in some situations, perhaps in order to secure the sale of
other systems in the deal that will ultimately help to recoup the margin loss, there are limits
as to how low the financial analyst is willing to go. Another point to ponder is the market
position of the product in question. If a strategic price point has been set, the financial
analyst will be aware of it and may be unwilling to drop below that level, even if it means the
loss of a sale or forcing a customer to choose a lower margin product.
Therefore, these margin boundaries play a significant role in day-to-day sales operations.
However, one could reasonably assume that if the boundaries were not altered throughout
the course of the quarter, then they would have no impact on the demand skew. In a typical
quarter, sales executives respond by adjusting their price and margin boundaries as the
quarter comes to a close so that they might meet their balanced quarterly objectives. This
allows the sales representatives to decrease pricing more dramatically within the new margin
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limits, which, in turn, leads to increased sales and contributes significantly to the hockey stick
demand skew.
It should be noted that while this scenario plays out in some quarters, there is occasionally
no need or incentive to lower the margin boundary. Some of the elements of the sales
executive's bonus plan are sales revenue, gross profit, and units sold. Depending on the
business situation both internally and externally at Dell at any given time, one or two of
these objectives may take priority over the others. For example, if Dell has recently
introduced a new consumer product line that is aggressively hitting sales targets and is
bringing in a considerable amount of revenue, it may only be lacking substantial average
margin points due to the fact that the consumer end of the business will not support high
margins. In such a situation, lowering margins even further on the remaining product lines
to stimulate even more unit sales and revenues does not make any sense, either for the
business or the for the sales executive's bonus plan. Conversely, if a high-margin server
product is flying out of the factory, Dell will likely be doing well in regards to revenue and
profit, but may want to stimulate unit sales. In this case, the sales executive is likely to allow
for further margin reductions on products that are not constrained by strategic pricing levels
in order to meet all three incentive objectives.
6.5 ORDERS PENDING RELEASE
One final contributor to the hockey stick demand skew within Dell's sales organization is the
treatment of orders when they are pending release. Orders are considered to be pending
release when they are going through the configuration check and the approval of the method
of payment by the customer. At any given time during the first ten weeks of a quarter, the
number of orders pending release exceeds those orders pending release during the last few
weeks of the quarter, when the organization is being urged to produce as many orders as
possible in order to meet financial commitments and objectives.
This decrease can be explained in two ways. First, like the rest of the Dell organization, the
Orders Pending Release (OPR) group tends to work a considerable amount of overtime late
in the quarter in order to process as many orders as possible before quarter-end. While
much of this time is spent dealing with the upsurge in sales volume, it is reasonable to
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conclude that they are also working to decrease any backlog of orders that may have
accumulated previously. Therefore, an increase in the number of hours worked can account
for some of the increase in the number of orders released to manufacturing late in the
quarter.
A second contributing factor is the level of scrutiny that the payment approval process goes
through late in the quarter. In an attempt to process and ship as many orders as possible,
some orders may pass more easily through the review process during the last few weeks of
the quarter. This decreased selectivity in order processing constitutes the second
determining factor in the reduction in the number of items in the order-processing queue.
While this data cannot be included due to issues with confidentiality, the relative change in
magnitude in the number of orders pending release throughout the course of a given quarter
is fairly insignificant when compared to the increase in sales volumes at the end of the
quarter. Therefore, while OPR releases aggravate the situation; they are not the primary root
cause.
6.6 MANUFACTURING BACKLOG
Similar to the OPR situation, the manufacturing organization operates with a certain backlog
of orders during regular operations as well. The manufacturing backlog is defined as those
orders which have been released to manufacturing from the OPR group, but which have not
been released onto the manufacturing floor for assembly. There are several reasons why a
certain amount of backlog is held. In some situations, it is an issue with a supplier
component that cannot be immediately acquired. If there is a particular disk drive or CD-
ROM that is unavailable, those orders will not be released to manufacturing because not all
of the necessary parts are available for kitting. There is also a minimal amount of backlog
that is held as a buffer in order to cover slight variations in order reception throughout the
course of a day. This allows for a more steady work flow and pace for the manufacturing
operation and reduces the probability that the line will run dry with no work.
Regardless of the basis for maintaining a manufacturing backlog, strategic or otherwise, the
average daily manufacturing backlog decreases significantly towards the end of the quarter.
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Regardless of the basis for maintaining a manufacturing backlog, strategic or otherwise, the
average daily manufacturing backlog decreases significantly towards the end of the quarter.
This reduction can also be traced to a number of reasons. Some of the decrease is inevitably
due to the additional effort applied at quarter-end, including longer hours and overtime in
order to ship every possible unit out the door. Another contributor may be the heroic
efforts within the supply chain management group to eliminate as many parts shortages as
possible at the end of the quarter so that a lack of parts will not be a barrier to production.
Again, this data is not releasable, but an examination of it shows that the relative change in
magnitude in the manufacturing backlog level throughout the course of a given quarter. Is
insignificant when compared to the magnitude of increase associated with additional sales
volumes.
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7 RECOMMENDATIONS TO ELIMINATE THE HOCKEY STICK
AT DELL COMPUTER CORPORATION
7.1 TOP-DOWN SALES INCENTIVES
It has been determined to this point that the hockey stick is a phenomenon that is internally
created within Dell and that there are several contributing factors to the current demand
skew. However, when one considers the impact of these various factors, the most
prominent element in the propagation of the hockey stick is the quarterly metrics and
incentive system within the Dell sales organization. Under this system of quarterly financial
goals, the Spiff program is utilized by the sales force to maximize their monetary incentive
package. This manifests itself in a manipulation of the demand skew, which results in an
upsurge in sales at the end of the quarter. The hockey stick is born.
Given this conclusion, the matter becomes a question of how to influence the Dell sales
system in such a way as to inspire a sales skew that would be congruent with the optimal
demand curve. The obvious solution to this issue is to provide Spiff programs that will
motivate the sales representatives in the correct fashion. However, given the dynamic and
sporadic fashion in which Spiff programs and incentives are created and implemented within
the various Dell business segments, it would be difficult to institutionalize a Spiff system that
would be sustainable in the current sales environment. Rather, a system must be developed
that is able to drive change from the top-down within the Dell sales organization.
Several factors within the Dell environment drive this need for a top-down system. One
primary reason for the current behavior patterns is that there is no real incentive for change
within the sales organization. While groups such as manufacturing, the treasury, and Dell's
supply base certainly feel the pain that the hockey stick inflicts, the sales organization does
not experience the same detrimental effects from the current demand skew. Their metrics
are all tied to the current incentive systems, which they currently optimize via the hockey
stick skew. From a sales point of view, the hockey stick pattern has almost invariably
allowed them to achieve their quarterly targets each quarter, which leaves them with no
incentive to change. In fact, there is such a focus placed upon making the numbers that risk
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aversion begins to enter into the picture and actually discourages any changes in behavior
patterns.
Therefore, if the sales groups are to be expected to drive behaviors that are more consistent
with the goals of the entire organization, such objectives must be included in their incentive
systems throughout the entire organization. And, given the ability of the sales executives to
influence the Spiff incentives enacted within their individual business segments, changes
made to the executive compensation packages will, in turn, be implemented throughout the
entire sales organization.
7.2 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
In determining a structure for an executive incentive system, several factors must be
considered. The incentive package should be structured in such a way as to drive the
placement of sales within the quarter, in addition to the total volume requirement. This can
be accomplished by establishing a preferred sales plan, based upon the optimal demand
skew, and then rewarding the management team according to their ability to execute to the
plan. While the inclusion of too much detail into the system would be counterproductive,
the establishment of weekly or monthly targets would fulfill the basic requirements of the
organization.
Bonus compensation may then be calculated using any of a number of simple statistics. One
method would be to calculate the percent difference from both the revenue and unit sales
targets for each time period, and then to average the absolute values of those percentages
across all of the individual time periods. This would provide an absolute measure of the
variation from target. The percent difference from the margin points could be calculated in
a similar manner, but without the use of the absolute value term in order to drive towards
the optimal profitability target. Each factor would then be weighted to determine the overall
percent difference metric and this representation of sales accuracy could be used to calculate
the bonus compensation awarded. Consider the fictitious example illustrated below in Table
2 where all three target factors are weighted equally.
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Table 2 - Bonus Compensation Plan Illustration
Revenue 100 100 100 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 160 160 160
Goal
Actual 85 90 85 110 180 190 185 175 175 170 175 170 180
Revenue
% Diff. 15% 10% 15% 12% 3% 9% 6% 0% 0% 3% 9% 6% 13% 8%
Margin 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Goal
Actual 10% 12% 11% 10% 7% 8% 9% 11% 11% 8% 9% 10% 12%
Margin
% Diff. 0% 20% 10% 0% (30)% (20)% (10)% 10% 10% (20)% (10)% 0% 20% 2%
Unit 100 100 .100 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 160 160 160
Goal (k)
Actual 85 90 85 110 180 190 185 175 175 170 175 170 180
Sales
% Diff. 15% 10% 15% 12% 3% 9% 6% 0% 0% 3% 9% 6% 13% 8%
Total 18%
After calculating the total percent error from the target, this figure can be used against the
targeted accuracy bonus allowed in order to determine the accuracy piece of the
compensation package. Our fictitious example is continued below in Table 3.
Table 3 - Calculation of the Accuracy Bonus
ACCURACY BONUS = (1-18%)*(MAXIUM ACCURACY BONUS)
= (0.86)*($5,000) = $4,300
This would be the amount received for achieving one's accuracy goals. The remaining
bonus compensation would be calculated using traditional quota-based metrics and would
simply be added to the accuracy portion of the bonus.
Such a compensation structure would incent the sales executives not only to achieve high
volume and revenue figures, but would also reward them for achieving these goals in the
most profitable and beneficial manner for the Dell organization as a whole. This ability to
motivate individual pieces of the organization toward a global, rather than local, optimum is
critical to the success of any organization and will allow Dell to gain a further competitive
advantage over its competitors. This competitiveness will be driven by improved
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profitability, decreased financial risks, and reduced operational burdens by eliminating the
hockey stick demand skew from Dell's sales cycle.
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8 CONCLUSION
8.1 KEY FINDINGS
This analysis of the hockey stick demand skew at Dell Computer Corporation has provided
many insights into the sales trends and behavior patterns at work within Dell's Direct
environment. The most significant findings are summarized in the following sections.
8.1.1 Profitability Impact
One notable discovery uncovered throughout the course of this investigation was the
magnitude of the potential margin gain associated with the alteration of the demand skew
distribution. This project was identified and resourced in an attempt to remedy operational
difficulties within Dell, but the lack of profit realization associated with the current hockey
stick pattern is certainly something that warrants attention in its own right.
Related to the profit scenario is the unexpected conclusion that gross margins, not operating
costs, drive the ultimate profitability level. While it was known at the start of the project that
manufacturing costs were a relatively small portion of the overall cost structure for a
computer system, it was anticipated that the additional costs associated with inefficient
manufacturing practices would have a greater impact on the overall demand skew
optimization model. This did not turn out to be the case.
8.1.2 Flexible, Internally Driven Demand Skew
The second major finding throughout this study was the fact that the demand skew was
indeed internally driven within the corporation. Previously, it was the opinion of some
within Dell, and within the industry as a whole, that the hockey stick was an external
phenomenon, which was driven by the markets. Therefore, it was thought that very little
could be done to alter or optimize the skew. Again, this was an incorrect view. Indeed,
there are very specific drivers of the hockey stick within Dell's Sales organization. This has
been strongly inferred through a thorough examination of the internal and external factors
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that could possibly have an impact on the sales skew. Given Dell's offset fiscal quarters,
there is no explanation other than that of an internally driven sales trend.
With an internally driven sales skew, corrective measures can be taken to remedy any sub-
optimal activities within the organization. An optimization of the timing and placement of
the demand volume within the quarter is feasible. This can be accomplished by
systematically harnessing the identified sales drivers in order to develop a more efficient and
profitable organization within the auspices of the Dell Direct Model. This is contrary to the
common thinking within most industries, where it is typically assumed that the sales skew is
permanently distributed in the hockey stick fashion. Therefore, the key finding here is not
only the discovery of the drivers of the demand skew, but also that the skew can be
successfully altered in order to reap significant rewards for the company.
8.1.3 Value-Added Counterbalance to the Declining COGS Curve
Another unexpected development throughout the course of this research was the true
behavior of the declining costs of goods sold. The computer industry is well known for its
rapid product advances and its high levels of competition between supplier and original
equipment manufacturers. While some suppliers are able to build a brand for their products,
or rely upon technological advantages, the majority of the components utilized by
companies, such as Dell, are considered to be commodity purchases. The competitive
nature of the industry pushes prices lower while the speed of technical innovation drives
product performance to unseen levels.
At Dell, much attention is given to the component costs because they have such a dramatic
impact on the total cost of a manufactured unit. Throughout the organization, the
phenomenon of continual decreases in component costs is taken as a given. Therefore,
when this project began, the intuitive answer to the question of determining an optimal
demand skew was that the current hockey stick method, in which the largest volumes are
sold at the end of the quarter, was ideal. After all, it seemed that lower component costs
would result in greater margins and increased earnings. However, upon further
investigation, it would be discovered that this was not exactly the case.
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After having several conversations with the supply chain and purchasing groups, the strategy
that Dell employs in the area of configuration management became clear. While it is true
that Dell enjoys the industry-wide decrease in COGS, the assumption that this is converted
into additional margin for the firm in order to increase earnings is not accurate. In reality,
the competitive nature of Dell's business makes it unwise, and even impossible, to enact an
arbitrage against the customer and net a greater return as a result of decreased component
prices. If Dell attempted such a feat on a large scale, other competitors would swoop in with
lower prices and would possibly have an opportunity to erode part of Dell's market share
and customer base.
Given this competitive landscape, Dell is left with two options. The company can either
choose to reduce sales prices, in order to pass component cost savings on to the customer,
or it can choose to offer additional value to the customer by way of improved system
performance at the same pricing level. While Dell employs both of these strategies where
appropriate, the latter is used most often in their establishment of configuration pricing
scenarios.
Regardless of the strategy chosen, the end result is the same. Rather than reaping additional
profits at the expense of market share, Dell wisely chooses to maintain its current margin
levels. As a result, customers are further delighted by either lower prices or added value, and
Dell continues to experience a dramatic growth in its market share, rather than a decline.
The implication of this finding is that while, on the surface, it may seem that Dell is able to
garner greater margins and levels of profitability later in the quarter, thereby making the
hockey stick an ideal demand skew, in reality, margins remain relatively constant across time.
This result ultimately destroys the one greatest rallying point for the argument of maintaining
the hockey stick demand skew on the basis of increased profitability. In actuality, increased
margins are much more achievable when one is able to react to the repeatable trends which
have been documented within the quarterly demand cycle. This is accomplished through the
recommendations that have been set forth in the body of this thesis.
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A8.2 THE INDIRECT COMPARISON
So far, this discussion has focused upon the elements of the Dell Direct Model that drive the
hockey stick demand skew within the company. However, it was originally noted that
indirect companies have many of the same issues. They use different methods to deal with
the problem such as scheduling queues and inventory management, but what about the
drivers of the hockey stick for these indirect companies? Are the root causes the same as
within Dell? If a solution is found to the problem at Dell, will that solution be applicable to
the Compaqs and IBMs of this world? As will soon be pointed out, this is hardly the case.
Despite its issues with the hockey stick demand skew, Dell's Direct Model puts it in an
enviable position when it comes to escaping from this vicious sales cycle.
From a macro point of view, the drivers of the hockey stick within an indirect company are
similar to those in Dell's Direct Model. The student syndrome, the use of quarterly
incentive packages, and end of quarter financial pressures all contribute to the demands
placed upon a firm at quarter-end, regardless of their direct or indirect nature. However,
these drivers manifest themselves in a different manner, given the structural complexity of
within the sales and distribution channels of a direct firm. While Dell's issue with the
hockey stick has a single source, and therefore a single correction point, the indirect firms
have a much more diverse problem on their hands.
Consider the steady state inventory level within the distribution channel of an indirect firm.
The indirect model pushes inventory into every crevice of the channel, from their internal
finished goods warehouses, to distributors'warehouses, to retail facility shelves. These
inventory levels can be assumed to be fairly constant across time, given the absence of any
extenuating circumstances. Then when the end of the quarter nears, the indirect
manufacturer has an incentive to increase sales volumes. Lacking a direct connection to the
customer, the manufacturer is forced to go through the distribution channel. The only sure
way to motivate sales in this realm is through price discounts. However, these discounts
cannot just be given on newly manufactured items, but must rather be implemented for
those items that are already sitting on shelves throughout the channel. The indirect
manufacturer handles this situation by "re-valuing" the merchandise. In other words, the
distribution channel has an agreement with the original equipment manufacturer that any
- 76 -
price reductions that are given must be made retroactive to the entire balance of unsold units
within the channel. This creates an administrative nightmare and requires the indirect
manufacturer to provide a refund on funds already received from the channel. This process
must be repeated at each step in the channel, from the distributors through to each retailer.
This not only slows the process, but also adds an additional cost component to the sales
system for indirect firms. Once the price discounts have made their way through the entire
sales channel, customers are incented to buy additional units, demand increases, and the
hockey stick is created.
This scenario certainly provides a contrast to Dell's dynamic pricing methodology. Given
the multiple problem points in the indirect system, it is clear that a solution to the issue is
not an easy one to achieve. Dell's advantage is a direct line to the customer where nothing is
manufactured until there is a customer willing to buy it. Without the hassles of a
complicated distribution channel, Dell has a direct line to correcting the behaviors that
contribute to the hockey stick. In contrast, an indirect firm must worry about coordination
issues with the distribution channel. Is it feasible to think that the response time of an
indirect system would be such as to allow it to react to the optimal demand skew posed for
Dell? Even if the original equipment manufacturer were to attempt such a feat, would there
be the appropriate level of cooperation from the rest of the channel? There are certainly
matters of synchronization that must be dealt with, given the fact that each link in the
channel has its own hockey stick issues to contend with.
So where does this leave the indirect company? Without even considering the inherent cost
disadvantages associated with an indirect system of channel distribution, there are additional
reasons why indirect systems will have difficulty eliminating the hockey stick demand skew.
The first consideration involves the costs associated with their current method of using
discounts to stimulate demand. The process of revaluing their inventory and coordinating
the discounts with the channel is not cheap or easy. Therefore, these firms currently only
use such tactics when necessary - at quarter-end and when there is a need to purge obsolete
products from the inventory shelves. The costs associated with creating a more dynamic
process that could respond to a more optimal demand skew do not make it an attractive
option for an indirect firm. Even if the costs could be ignored, the likelihood of converting
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such a complex and convoluted channel to a more flexible and dynamic pricing system is
improbable at best.
8.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis has explored the current hockey stick demand skew at Dell, provided an analysis
of that skew in terms of profit optimization, delved into the financial and operational issues
surrounding the current sales practices, investigated the drivers of the sales cycle, and
proposed recommendations for alleviating the challenge of the hockey stick at Dell.
However, this does not mean that there are not other scenarios that can be implemented
successfully, or that other options should not be explored. The following sections briefly
examine these alternatives and suggest areas for future study or contemplation.
8.3.1 The Online Option
There is one gradual revolution spreading through the Dell organization that may mitigate
the hockey stick demand skew to a point that it is no longer a concern from either a financial
risk or an operational perspective. This revolution is called on-line sales. While the internet-
based on-line sales effort has certainly been viewed as a core competency of Dell's for some
time now, it may also provide a necessary escape hatch for the hockey stick issues which
abound within the organization today. As mentioned previously, the hockey stick
phenomenon is only present in those transactions in which a sales representative plays an
active part. Internet and unsolicited telephone sales have an arrival rate, which is much
steadier across the span of time. And, with internet-based sales continually rising as a
percentage of overall sales, Dell is on a slow path to reducing the impact of the hockey stick
demand skew.
But is this path one that will advance quickly enough to truly save Dell from the detrimental
effects of the hockey stick? There was not sufficient data at the time of this writing to make
any definitive conclusions one way or the other on the matter, but this is definitely a topic
that warrants attention, regardless of whether significant changes are made to the current
compensation system.
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8.3.2 An Analytically Rigorous Sales Process
Another area for further study and improvement is centered around the sales processes that
are in place at Dell. A more analytical approach could be taken in the sales segments in
order to make the data more readily available. With a little devoted programming time, a
better computer-based system could be developed to capture sales performances, update and
track the personal incentive system database, and develop quotas for the upcoming time
period based upon a standard algorithm. By simply increasing the availability of this data,
the sales segments would have a clearer view of where they stand throughout the quarter,
both individually and as a sales unit, and would be more likely to accurately achieve their
sales quotas.
The availability of such data would also allow the organization to utilize it in a value-added
manner. Simple analysis of variance and regression techniques could be priceless if used to
examine the effectiveness of various Spiffs and incentive plans. Using an analytical approach
in the establishment of quotas would not only result in greater consistency, but would also
remove the current occasional cries of dissatisfaction from sales representatives who feel
that quotas are set in an unfair or biased manner.
8.3.3 Drive for Linearity
One suggestion that has come up repeatedly throughout the course of this work is the
implementation of a linear demand skew that would accommodate constant growth over the
course of time. A major telecommunications firm in Silicon Valley has successfully
implemented such an approach by rewarding their sales representatives based upon sales
variation. While such an approach is certainly implementable from a sales perspective,
would provide an ideal situation from an operations perspective, and would provide the least
amount of financial risk for Dell, there are also several concerns about utilizing such an
approach at Dell.
Aside from the sub-optimal profitability levels associated with approach when compared to
the recommended sales skew, this approach does not take into account the fact that
segment-specific incentives are necessary due to account diversity. Some sales segments,
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such as the educational or governmental divisions, experience market factors, which
necessitate the use of segment-specific sales plans and incentives. For example, the higher
education sector sees a large increase in August when many students and university
employees return to campus and have a need to purchase a computer system. Straight linear
sales incentives would not facilitate the attainment of these market objectives. Therefore,
some flexibility is needed in the system.
It is this author's belief that the proposed sales incentive system allows for a simple method
by which to integrate the necessary individual market segment requirements with the ability
to successfully achieve the extraordinary growth rates that are projected by Dell. In addition,
the proposed recommendation provides a path towards greater profit realization for the
company. Therefore, while the concept of achieving constant linear growth is a noble one
that is perhaps the right solution in some situations, for Dell it seems that a more flexible
system of sales incentives is appropriate.
8.3.4 Monthly Quotas
Another potential alternative to the proposed sales recommendations is the notion of
utilizing monthly, rather than quarterly, quotas under the current Dell compensation system.
Some of the sales segments within Dell that serve home and small business customers have
already implemented such an approach, which allows for a more finely-tuned control of
monthly sales volumes. However, upon discussing this option with some of the remaining
sales segments within Dell, it became clear that there are some definite barriers to
implementation that would need to be overcome before such a system could become
commonplace at Dell.
The primary objection to a monthly system of quotas within the sales organization is the
increased difficult of maintaining such a system. While the current compensation system is
automated, the structure of the system is not tremendously flexible. In addition, much of
the current Spiff program is tracked, calculated, and managed manually. There currently are
full-time employees dedicated to this task and any increase in complexity would simply
increase the need for additional labor.
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Another complexity issue that arises is in terms of the time and energy that must be
expended whenever new quotas are introduced. Prior sales performance levels and market
trends must be scrutinized in order to develop fair and accurate quotas for each sales
segment. This process currently takes two to three weeks each quarter. At such a rate, the
monthly quotas would not be available until the month was almost out, eradicating any
benefits that might have been available.
Given these process related issues, the sales organization at Dell would need to make some
serious operational improvements before any shift could be made toward enacting a policy
of monthly quotas. As discussed previously, these systematic improvements are not
unachievable, and could even serve as the basis of a follow-on thesis topic. Basic updates to
the current computer system would not only free up the manual labor being consumed by
the current system inefficiencies, but would also provide for a flexible and more responsive
sales compensation system that would allow the business segments to more readily achieve
their goals and objectives.
8.3.5 Fiscal Quarter Shift
Another proposal that came up during the discussions over how to best alter the sales
compensation system at Dell in order to achieve optimal profitability levels was the
suggestion not to change sales behaviors at all. Rather, the proposition was to leave the
current compensation system in place, and simply shift the fiscal quarter ahead a month, as
pictured in Figure 16.
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Figure 16 - Fiscal Quarter Shift
0
1 2 3 urrent Scenario
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This type of fiscal shift would certainly allow for an increase in sales during month two, and
would allow for better end of quarter predictability from a financial risk perspective, but it
does not alleviate the issue of the sales spike. From an operational perspective, the situation
would be somewhat improved due to the additional time that would be given to
"recuperate" and capture what would otherwise have been lost sales after the spike hits and
before the end of quarter. However, all of the difficulties associated with staffing up human
resources for the large demand upswing and maintaining enough physical facility capacity to
handle the hockey stick would still be in place.
Furthermore, the number of internal issues associated with the complexity increase that
would result from such an organizational change would be immense. Internally, incentive
reporting systems would need to be altered to reward sales representatives during month two
of the actual fiscal quarter for the organization. Additional incentives would also need to be
offered to the sales representatives in order to drive sales at the end of the fiscal quarter in
order to drive sales to meet Wall Street expectations.
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From an organizational point of view, the company would have to deal with a misalignment
between the goals and administrative systems that are in place for the sales representatives
verses their executive management team. This misalignment would be a product of the fact
that the sales representatives quarterly quotas and systems would be completed and paid out
a month prior to those of their management team. This goes beyond a question of where
the dividing line would be drawn in the organizational chart and includes issues such as
whether there would be asynchronous motives and objectives at work between the two
groups. Without a clear examination of such potential internal organizational pitfalls, a
change such as this one could easily create more problems that it helps to solve.
And these are simply the internal issues that must be dealt with. A closer examination of the
external impact of such a move would also be needed before such an action could take place.
The legalities and accounting hassles associated with changing the fiscal reporting system for
a company are numerous and potentially troublesome. In addition, work would need to be
done to "spin" this organizational change to Wall Street analysts so that they would see it as
a positive move for the business and not just a organizational distraction that will divert the
attention of the firm from more pressing matters.
Therefore, based upon on the many and diverse issues associated with this type of
organizational change, and the real potential for a detrimental end result to Dell, it is this
author's opinion that such a drastic change should not be implemented within the company,
given the current and projected state of the hockey stick presentation. There are other
solutions available that are more easily implemented and which are associated with a much
lower degree of risk. Therefore, proceeding along the path of the sales recommendations
posed previously seems to be a much more prudent course of action.
8.3.6 Staggered Quarterly Cycles
Another suggestion that runs into some of the same issues as the fiscal quarter shift is that of
utilizing staggered sales cycles within the organization. Under this scenario, the sales
segments would each be assigned to one of three groups. Each group would then have their
sales cycles and quota end dates established in a different month of the Dell fiscal quarter.
Under the current incentive plans, which drive the hockey stick demand skew, all of these
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individual sales spikes would be aggregated across time and would result in a demand growth
curve that would be much smoother than that which is currently projected.
As to the barriers to implementation for such a system, this proposal would not create quite
the same external disruption because the fiscal quarter will not change, but the internal
systems would have to go through a complete overhaul in order to make this feasible.
Aspects of flexibility would need to be designed into the sales systems, which are not
currently available. However, despite these immediate hurdles that would need to be
addressed in order to implement a system, this author believes that such a system is certainly
a viable proposition if sufficient management support could be garnered to drive its
acceptance throughout the organization.
8.4 CONCLUSION
After examining the impact of the hockey stick demand phenomenon at Dell Computer
Corporation, the drivers that work to create this situation, and various potential resolutions
to the issue, it is this author's conclusion that the most effective and feasible course of action
would be the alteration of the sales incentives systems, which are offered to the executive
management team.
The hockey stick is internally driven. It is motivated by the incentives that are in place for
the sales representatives. These incentives are created by the executive management team in
response to their own goals and objectives. Establishing a time-based component to the
current top-level incentive programs will drive behaviors throughout the organization and
will result in a more effectively balanced sales skew. This more optimal sales skew will not
only improve profitability measures, but will also eliminate some financial risk for Dell
Computer Corporation and will remove the current operational burdens that disturb the
renowned manufacturing efficiency of the Dell Direct Model. Therefore, the
implementation of a top-down, metrics-based incentive system for sales executives is
recommended.
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APPENDIX A: DEMAND SKEW OPTIMIZATION MODEL
APPENDIX A.1 - LINDO MODEL CODE
MODEL:
SETS:
!Define the sets of variables
WEEKTYPE / W40 W42 W44 W46 W48 W50 W52 W54 W56 W58 W60 W62/:
AVAILHRS, PAIDHRS, RATE;
WEEK / WKO WK1 WK2 WK3 WK4 WK5 WK6 WK7 WK8 WK9 WK10 WK11 WK12
WK13 WK14 /: PERMS, TEMPS, BLDRS, BUFFER, NONBLDRS, WEEKLYRATE,
WEEKLYHRSPAID, WSDEMAND, K2_DEMAND, GECKO DEMAND,
HEADCOUNT, REVENUE, LOGISTICS, WSPRICE, K2_PRICE, GECKOPRICE,
PRICE DISCOUNT, LOGPERBOX, COGS, WSCOGS, K2_COGS,
GECKOCOGS, COSTDECREASE, TOTALDEMAND, LABORCOST;
LINKS (WEEKTYPE, WEEK) : BINARYWEEK;
ENDSETS
DATA:
! Assign values to some of the variables, set up prompts
! for some data from the user
AVAILHRS = XX.XX XX.XX XX.XX XX.XX XXXX XX.XX XX.XX XX.XX XX.XX
XX.XX XX.XX XX.XX;
PAIDHRS = XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX;
WSDEMAND = 0,,,,,,,,,,,,,
GECKODEMAND= ))))=0
K2 DEMAND = 0,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,
MAXTEMPPERCENTAGE =?;
MAXOTPERCENTAGE = ?;
PERMS =XXX,,,,,,
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TEMPRATE = X.XX;
TEMPBURDEN = X.XX;
PERMRATE = X.XX;
PERMBURDEN = X.XX;
PERMHIRE_FEE = XXX;
PERMADMIN_FEE = X.XX;
WSBUILDRATE = .XXXX;
GECKOBUILDRATE = .XXXX;
K2_BUILDRATE = .XXXX;
WS NONBLDRRATIO = X.XX;
GECKONONBLDRRATIO = X.XX;
K2_NONBLDRRATIO = X.XX;
OTHERPERSONNEL = XX;
ROUNDINGPERSONNEL = XX;
LOG PER BOX = X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX
X.XX~X.XX X.XX X.XX X.XX;
PRICEDISCOUNT = 0, -.XXXX, -. XXXX, XXXX, -. XXXX, -. XXXX,. XXXX,.
XXXX, XXXX, -. XXX) -. XXXX, -. XXXX, -. XXXX,. XXXX, -. XXXX;
COSTDECREASE = 0, -. XXXX XXXX,. XXXXI, -. XXXX, -. XXXX,. XXXX,.
XXXX3. XXXX, -. XXXX,. XXXX, -. XXXX,. XXXX,. XXXX, -. XXXX;
WSCOGS= XXXX.XX,,,, , , ,,, ,,,,;
K2_COGS=XXXX.XX ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,);
GECKOCOGS = XXXXXX, , , , ,, , , ,, , , ;
WSPRICE = XXXX.XX, , , , , , , , , , , , , ;
K2_PRICE =XXXX.XX,, , ,)) , , ,, )),,),,);
- 88 -
GECKOPRICE = XXXX.XX, , , , , , ,,;
TOTAL WSDEMAND =?;
TOTALK2_DEMAND =?;
TOTALGECKODEMAND = ?;
STDWEEK = 40;
SPIKELIMIT = ?;
! Export key solution values to an Excel spreadsheet
@OLE('C:\MY DOCUMENTS\OUTPUTXLS', 'WS', 'DEMANDK2','GECKO',
'PERMS', 'TEMPS', 'HEADCOUNT,'TOTALWS', 'TOTALK2','TOTALGECKO',
'TEMPPCT', 'OTPCT', 'SPIKELIMIT') = WS DEMAND, K2_DEMAND,
GECKO DEMAND, PERMS, TEMPS, HEADCOUNT, TOTAL WS DEMAND,
TOTAL K2 DEMAND, TOTAL GECKODEMAND, MAXTEMP_ PERCENTAGE,
MAX_OT_PERCENTAGE, SPIKELIMIT;
ENDDATA
INIT:
! Initialize some of the data to obtain a better local
! optimum for the solution
WSDEMAND = 0, XXXX, XXXX XXXX, X XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX,
XXXIX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX;
GECKODEMAND = 0, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX,
XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XX)X
K2_DEMAND = 0, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX,
XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXX)X XXXX, XXX)X
ENDINIT
Establish binary variables for week types
@FOR(LINKS(Ij):[INTEGER]@BIN(BINARYWEEK(IJ)));
Constrain the sum of the binary week types to 1. This allows a
week of 40 hours or 42 hours or 44 hours, etc.
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@FOR(WEEK(J) (J #GE # 2): [BINARYSUM]
@SUM(WEEKTYPE(I):BINARYWEEK(I,J))= 1);
! Objective function: Maximize the Revenue, plus the logistics
! revenue margin, minus the labor costs and COGS.
[OBJECTIVE] MAX = @SUM(WEEK(J) I (J #GE# 2):(REVENUE(J)+LOGISTICSG)-
LABORCOST(J)- COGS(J)));
! Constraint: The sum of the weekly demands for workstations for
! weeks 1 through 13 must equal the total workstation demand for
! the quarter.
@SUM(WEEK(J) 1(2 #LE # J #LE# 14):WSDEMAND(J)) = (TOTAL_WSDEMAND);
! Constraint: The sum of the weekly demands for K2s for weeks 1
! through 13 must equal the total K2 demand for the quarter.
@SUM(WEEK(J) 1(2 #LE # J #LE # 14):K2_DEMAND(J)) = (TOTAL_K2_DEMAND);
! Constraint: The sum of the weekly demands for Geckos for weeks
! 1 through 13 must equal the total Gecko demand for the quarter.
@SUM(WEEK(J) 1(2 #LE # J #LE # 14):GECKODEMAND(J)) =
(TOTALGECKODEMAND);
! The number of hours paid each week is determined by the binary
! week code (0,1) multiplied by the standard hours for that type
! of week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[HOURSPAID]
@SUM(WEEKTYPE(I):BINARYWEEK(IJ)*PAIDHRS(I)) =
(WEEKLYHRSPAID(J)));
! The workstation price for any given week equal the workstation
! price for the previous week times the historical price discount
! for the current week.
@FOR(WEEKG) |J #GE# 2):[WPRICE] (WSPRICE(J)) = (WSPRICE(J-1)*
(1+PRICEDISCOUNT())));
! The K2 price for any given week equal the K2 price for the
! previous week times the historical price discount for the
! current week.
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(1+PRICEDISCOUNT(J))));
The Gecko price for any given week equal the Gecko price for
the previous week times the historical price discount for the
current week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) |( #GE # 2):[GPRICE] (GECKO PRICE(J)) =
(GECKOPRICE(J-1)*(1+PRICEDISCOUNTJ))));
! The revenue for any given week equals the demand for each
! product multiplied by the price for that product for the given
! week.
@FOR(WEEK) I (J #GE# 2):[REV] (REVENUE(J)) =
(WSDEMAND()*WSPRICEG)+K2_DEMAND(J)*K2_PRICEG)+
GECKODEMANDJ)*-GECKOPRICE(J)));
! The labor cost for each week is equal to the hours to be paid,
! multiplied by the number of temps and permanent employees and
! their respective pay rates, plus the hiring fee for new
! permanent employees and the admin fee for all current permanent
! employees.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I ( #GE # 2):[LABOR] (LABOR COST()) =
(WEEKLYHRSPAID(J)*(TEMP_RATE*'TEMP_BURDEN*TEMPS(J)+
PERMRATE*PERMBURDENPERMS(J))+(PERMS(J)-
PERMS(J-1))*PERM HIREFEE+PERMS(J)*PERMADMINFEE));
! The total demand for a given week is the sum of the demands for
! the three product groups.
@FOR(WEEK(J) |J #GE# 2):[DEMAND] (TOTAL_DEMANDG)) =
(WSDEMAND(J)+K2_DEMAND(J)+GECKODEMAND()));
! Constraint: The total demand for any given week must be less
! than or equal to the total demand for the quarter multiplied by
! a user-defined limit. This controls how large of a production
! spike is allowed in any given week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[DEMANDLIMIT](TOTALDEMAND(J)) <
(SPIKE LIMIT*(TOTAL WSDEMAND+TOTALK2_DEMAND+
TOTAL_GECKO_DEMAND)));
The total number of builders, non-builders, and idle employees
must be equal to the assigned number of temporary and permanent
employees.
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@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[MFGEQSTAFFING]
(BLDRS(J)+BUFFER(f)+NON_BLDRS(J)) = (PERMS(J)+TEMPSJ)));
! The total logistics revenue margin is equal to the revenue per
! box multiplied by the total demand.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I ( #GE # 2):[LOG COSTS] (LOGISTICS(J)) =
(LOGPERBOX(J)*TOTALDEMAND()));
! The COGS for workstations for any given week is equal to the
! COGS for workstations for the previous week, multiplied by the
! historical cost decrease for the current week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE# 2):[WCOGS] (WSCOGSJ)) =
(WSCOGS(J-1)*1(1+COSTDECREASEJ))));
! The COGS for K2s for any given week is equal to the COGS for
! K2s for the previous week, multiplied by the historical cost
! decrease for the current week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) |( #GE # 2):[KCOGS] (K2 COGS(J)) =
(K2_COGS([-1)*1(1+COSTDECREASE())));
! The COGS for Geckos for any given week is equal to the COGS for
! Geckos for the previous week, multiplied by the historical cost
! decrease for the current week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE# 2):[GCOGS] (GECKO_COGS()) =
(GECKOCOGS([-1)*(1 +COSTDECREASE())));
! The total Cost of Goods Sold for each week equals the weekly
! demand for each product multiplied by the COGS for that product
! for the given week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[COGSCOSTS] (COGS()) =
(WSDEMAND(J)*WSCOGS()+K2_DEMAND([)*K2_COGSJ)+
GECKO_DEMAND()*GECKOCOGS(J)));
! The number of non-builders needed for any given week is
! determined by multiplying the total number of builders for that
! week by the appropriate builder ratio for each product and by
! the ratio of each product as a percentage of total demand, and
! adding the number of fixed personnel that are required. (The
! 1X104 calculation is added to prevent a division by zero.)
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@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[NOTBLDRS] NONBLDRS(J) =
(BLDRS()*((WS DEMAND/(TOTALDEMAND+.0000000001))
*WSNONBLDRRATIO+(GECKO DEMAND/(TOTALDEMAND+
0.0000000001))*GECKONONBLDRRATIO+(K2_DEMAND/
(TOTALDEMAND+.0000000001))*K2_NONBLDR_RATIO)+
OTHERPERSONNEL+ROUNDINGPERSONNEL));
! The "rate" for each type of week, is calculated as the inverse
! of the available hours for each type of week.
@FOR(WEEKTYPE(I):[RATECALC]RATE(I) = 1/AVAILHRS(I));
! The total headcount for each week is sum of the permanent and
! temporary employees.
@FOR(WEEK(J) (1 #GE # 2):[HEADCOUNT_SUM] (HEADCOUNT(J)) =
(PERMS(J)+TEMPS(J)));
! Constraint: The number of permanent employees for any given
! week must be greater than or equal to the number of permanent
! employees from the previous week, i.e. no permanent employees
! may be let go from week to week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[NOFIRING]PERMS(J) >= PERMS(J-1));
! Constraint: The number of temporary employees may not exceed a
! maximum percentage that is entered by the user.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[TEMP PERCENT]
(MAXTEMPPERCENTAGE*-HEADCOUNT(J)) >= TEMPS(J));
! Constraint: The total amount of overtime worked may not exceed
! a maximum percentage that is entered by the user. The amount
! of overtime worked is calculated by subtracting a standard 40
! hour week from the actual hours worked for that week.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I (J #GE# 2):[MAXOT] (WEEKLYHRSPAID(J)-STDWEEK) <=
(MAXOTPERCENTAGE*STDWEEK));
! The "weekly rate" is the required number of hours to be worked
! for a given week. This rate is calculated by multiplying the
! binary week type variable by the inverse of the available hours
! for that week type (the rate).
@FOR(WEEK(J) I #GE # 2):[WEEK RATE]
@SUM(WEEKTYPE(I): BINARYWEEK(IJ)*RATE(I)) =
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(WEEKLYRATE(J)));
! The number of builders required for a given week is equal to
! the sum of the demand for each product line multiplied by the
! build rate for that product.
@FOR(WEEK(J) I J #GE # 2):[BUILDERS] BLDRS(J) =
(WSDEMANDJ)*WSBUILD_RATE+K2_DEMAND()*K2 BUILDRATE+
GECKODEMAND()*GECKOBUILD_RATE)*WEEKLYRATE(J));
END
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APPENDIX A.2 - OPTI
Variables:
AvailableHours;
PaidHours,
*BinaryWeek;
*Perms,
*Temps,
*Builders,
Bufferj
NonBuilders
WeeklyHours,
WeeklyHoursPaid
*WorkstationDemand,
*K2_Demand
*GeckoDemand
Headcount,
Revenue
MIZATION VARIABLES
(An asterisk indicates a dcisimriable.)
Hours available to build for each week type (i), given the
calculated optimal shift configurations (See spreadshet.)
Hours paid for each week type (i)
Binary variable associated with each week type (i) and week
0). This variable is multiplied by the AvailableHours to
determine the actual Weekly Hours that are available to
build.
Number of permanent employees for each week ()
Number of temporary employees for each week 6)
Number of builders for each week ()
Number of buffer employee for each week 6). Buffer
employees are permanent employees that cannot be fired, but
which are not utilized given the current volume levels.
Number of employees who do jobs other than in the build
cells for each week 6)
The actual number of hours available to build for a given
week 6)
The actual number of hours paid for a given week 6)
The demand for workstations for each week 0)
The demand for K2s (an Optiplex product built on the
workstation lines) for each week 6)
The demand for Geckos (a Server product built on the
workstation lines) for each week 6)
The total number of employees for a given week 6)
The total revenue earned from the sale of products for a
given week 6)
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Logistics,
WorkstationsPrice;
K2_Pricej
GeckoPrice,
PriceDiscount
LogPerBox;
COGS
WorkstationCOGS,
K2_COGS,
GeckoCOGS
CostDecrease
TotalDemand
LaborCost,
MaxTempPercentage
MaxOTPercentage
TempRate
PermRate
TempBurden
PermBurden
The logistics profit margin for a given week 0); calculated by
subtracting the historical logistics costs from the historical
logistics revenue for workstations products.
The price of a Workstation unit for a given week 6)
The price of a K2 unit for a given week 0)
The price of a Gecko unit for a given week ()
The historical price discount for week 0) from week (-1)
The historical logistics profit margin per box for a given week
0); calculated by subtracting the historical logistics costs from
the historical logistics revenue for workstations products.
The total cost of goods sold for a given week 0)
The cost of goods sold for Workstation units for week 6)
The cost of goods sold for K2 units for week 0)
The cost of goods sold for Gecko units for week 6)
The historical decrease in costs for 0) from week (-1)
The total demand for a given week 0)
The cost of labor for a given week 0)
The maximum percentage of temporary employees allowed in
the workforce at any given time; a user-defined value.
The maximum percentage of overtime that can be worked in
a given week; a user-defined value.
Pay rate for temporary employees
Pay rate for permanent employees
The additional costs incurred for temporary employees;
consists of payments made to the temporary agency
The additional overhead costs for permanent employees
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PermHireFee
PermAdminFee
WorkstationBuildRate
K2_BuildRate
GeckoBuildRate
WorkstationNonBldrRatio
K2_NonBldrRatio
GeckoNonBldrRatio
OtherPersonnel
RoundingPersonnel
TotalWorkstationDemand
TotalK2_Demand
TotalGeckoDemand
StdWeek
Spike Limit
MinimumDemand
The costs associated with hiring a new permanent employee;
consists of payments made to the employment agency for
locating and training the employee
Additional costs incurred for permanent employees; consists
of the costs to cut payroll checks, etc.
Number of hours needed to build each Workstation unit
Number of hours needed to build each K2 unit
Number of hours needed to build each Gecko unit
The ratio of non-builder personnel needed to produce a
Workstation unit when compared to the number of builders
needed
The ratio of non-builder personnel needed to produce a K2
unit when compared to the number of builders needed
The ratio of non-builder personnel needed to produce a
Gecko unit when compared to the number of builders
needed
Fixed personnel
Additional fixed personnel
Total Workstation demand for the quarter, a user-defined
value
Total K2 demand for the quarter; a user-defined value
Total Gecko demand for the quarter; a user-defined value
Hours in a standard week
The maximum volume percentage allowed in a given week; a
user-defined value
The minimum volume percentage allowed in a given week; a
user-defined value
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Objective Function:
14
MAX Z (Revenue, + Logistics - LaborCost, - COGS); wh/ 1<=j<= 14
j=1 - I
Constraints:
13
E WorkstationDemand = TotalWorkstationDemand
j=1
13
Z K2_Demand = TotalK2_Demand
j=1
13
Z GeckoDemand; = TotalGeckoDemandj=1
TotalDemandj = WorkstationDemand + K2_Demand + GeckoDemand; whe l <=j
<=14
TotalDemand; <= SpikeLimit * (TotalWorkstationDemand + TotalK2_Demand +
TotalGeckoDemand); dxe 1 <=1 <=14
TotalDemand, > = MinimumDemand * (TotalWorkstationDemand +
TotalK2_Demand + TotalGeckoDemand); um 1 <=j<= 14
12
Z BinaryWeek, = 1
1:=1
12
X BinaryWeeki1 * AvailableHours; = WeeklyHours; w/'e 1<=j<=141
12
E (Binary Week;j * PaidHours) = Weekly HoursPaidj; whme1<=j<=14
1=1
WorkstationPrice = WorkstationPrice * (1+PriceDiscount); w/he 1<=j <=14
K2_Price = K2_Pricej1 * (1+PriceDiscount); due 1<=j<= 14
GeckoPrice = GeckoPrice1 * (1+PriceDiscount); w/he 1< =j< = 14
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Revenue = WorkstationDemand- * WorkstationPrice; + K2_Demandj * K2_Price +
GeckoDemand * GeckoPrice; zkse 1< =j<= 14
LaborCost, = Weekly HoursPaid * (TempRate * Temp_Burden * Temps; +
Perm_Rate * PermBurden * Perms) + ((Permsj - Permsj-) * Perm HireFee) +
(Perms; * PermAdminFee); kev 1 <=j<= 14
NonBuilders, = Builders; * ((WorkstationDemand / TotalDemand
Workstation Non BuilderRatio) + (K2_Demand / TotalDemand
K2_Non BuilderRatio) + (GeckoDemand / TotalDemand *
GeckoNonBuilder Ratio)) + OtherPersonnel + RoundingPersonnel;
ukv1 <=j<=14
Builders, + Buffer + NonBuilders, = Perms; + Tempsj; whn 1<=j<=14
Builders, = ((WorkstationDemand; * WorkstationBuildRate) + (K2_Demand, *
K2_BuildRate) + (GeckoDemand * GeckoBuildRate)) / WeeklyHours;
kv 1 <<= j<= 14
Headcount = Perms, + Temps,; kme 1 <=1 <= 14
Temps, <= MaxTempPercentage * Headcountj; w/v 1 <=j<= 14
Perms, > = Perms; dak 1 <=j<= 14
(WeeklyHoursPaid, - StdWeek) <= (MaxOTPercentage * StdWeek) ; whee1 <=
<=14
Logisticsj = (LogisticsPerBox, * TotalDemand); w/n 1 <=j<= 14
WorkstationCOGS, = WorkstationCOGS1 * (1 + CostDecrease); w/he 1 <=J< = 14
K2_COGS = K2_COGS1 * (1+CostDecrease); w/hv 1 <=< = 14
GeckoCOGS, = GeckoCOGS * (1 +CostDecrease); wne 1 <=j <=14
COGS = WorkstationDemand, * WorkstationCOGS + K2_Demand *K2_COGS +
GeckoDemand * GeckoCOGS; ukse 1<=j<=14
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APPENDIX A.3 - REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PRODUCT TYPE
Product Type Analysis:
Regression Analysis for Workstations / Hour / Builder
Analysis of Variance
SS
20.05828487
65.78036348
85.83864835
MS
4.011656973
0.432765549
F
9.269815909
Significance F
0.00
Conclusion: With a p-value of 0.00 for the product mix, there is a statistical difference
between the build rates. This demonstrates that the type of unit assembled
has a significant impact on the average build rate.
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Regression
Residual
Total
df
5
152
157
APPENDIX A.4 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SHIFT TYPE
Shift Type Analysis:
Analysis of Variance for Workstations / Hour / Builder
Source
Shift
Error
Total
Figure 17 -
Conclusion:
DF Seq SS
4 5.6447
153 80.1371
157 85.7818
Shift Effect
Adj SS
5.6447
80.1371
Adj MS
1.4112
0.5238
F P
2.69 0.033
With a p-value of 0.033 for the type of shift worked, there is a statistical
difference between the build rates. This demonstrates that the type of shift
worked has a significant impact on the average build rate.
- 101 -
Shift Effect
0 1 2 
3 6
Shift
i i
3 6
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The actual data cannot be mleased due confidentiality issues.
II Hours Ava~lable Build
Worked Hours 4 Hours S
42 39.5043148
44 41.55 45.65
45 42.55 47.81
46
47
4S
46
5Sc
43.25
4400
4475
45.50
48.25
49.20
50.60
52.02
53.46
54.9251 47.75 51.93
117 _ 52 48.25 54.88
12853 49.25 54.7
55... .. 51.25 54.45
56 .25 8
57 5300 6018
58 53.75 61.59
59 55.25 5870
60 55.75 61.56
61 56.75 61.48
62 57.75 61.36
63 58.75 61.20
ed for explanatoy purposes.
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APPENDIX B: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE MODELS FOR PRICE AND
COST POINTS
* The terms "Price Delta" and "Cost Delta" are used here to describe the percent
increase or decrease in price and cost levels from week to week.
. Deltas were used rather than actual dollar figures to adjust for trends in the actual
price and cost levels over time.
. The variation analysis was performed to determine whether a statistically significant
difference was consistently present between the deltas from week to week over an 18
month historical period.
Conclusion: With p-values of 0.011 for price and 0.000 for cost, there is a statistical
difference between the weekly changes. This demonstrates a repeatable cost
and price pattern from quarter to quarter.
APPENDIX B.1 - PRICE ANALYSIS
Price Analysis:
One-Way Analysis of Variance on Price
Source
Week
Error
Total
DF
12
64
76
SS
0.022548
0.049414
0.071962
MS
0.001879
0.000772
Unusual Observations for Price
Obs
1
21
25
49
61
Price
-0.084000
0.039000
0.034000
0.063000
-0.075000
Fit
-0.033600
-0.012500
-0.020167
-0.003167
-0.021500
St. Dev.Fit
0.012426
0.011344
0.011344
0.011344
0.011344
- 103 -
F
2.43
p
0.011
Residual
-0.050400
0.051500
0.054167
0.066167
-0.053500
St.Resid
-2.03R
2.03R
2.14R
2.61R
-2.11R
Week
1
4
5
9
11
Figure 18 shows the average price deltas by week and Figure 19 shows the box plot
representation of the data.
Figure 18 - Weekly Price Deltas
Figure 19 - Box Plot Representation of Price Deltas
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APPENDIX B.2 - COST ANALYSIS
Cost Analysis:
One-Way Analysis of Variance on Cost
Source DF
Week 12
Error 64
Total 76
SS
0.058753
0.054089
0.112842
MS
0.004896
0.000845
Unusual Observations for Cost
Obs Price
25 0.018000
49 0.039000
Figure 20 shows the average cost deltas by week and Figure 21
representation of this data.
Figure 20 - Weekly Cost Deltas
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Figure 21 - Box Plot Representation of Cost Deltas
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